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1. Introduction 
The topic of the equal integration of both genders in the workforce has been frequently 
discussed in the 21st century, especially given that since 1970, participation rates of 
working-aged women have heavily increased all over Europe (see AHN/MIRA 2002). 
According to JOCHMANN/SCHAWILYE/SCHMIDT (2012), gender is the most-often men-
tioned dimension of diversity in the annual reports of German DAX-30–listed compa-
nies. Numerous reports, official documents, and policy initiatives from European in-
stitutions serve to promote the equal treatment of male and female employees. Euro-
pean members confirmed their desire to increase female participation in decision-mak-
ing positions in academia and in business through the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (see 
HOLST 2006). The European Parliament has stressed the importance of equal partici-
pation of females and males in highly ranked positions in all fields (see SZYDLO 2014). 
Although in recent years, companies and politicians have addressed gender issues, in 
many areas of the workforce, an unequal distribution of highly ranked positions be-
tween men and women still exists. Qualified female employees often do not hold such 
positions. For example, there is a large gap between the percentage of employed and 
well-educated women and those holding professorship positions or sitting on the 
boards of EU companies. In Germany, young women account for about half of univer-
sity graduates, but they hold only 14 percent of full professorships (C4/W3) (see Ex-
pertenkommission Forschung und Innovation 2013: 109). Also in Germany, the over-
all percentage of women in the workforce was 55 percent in 2013, but they only held 
10 percent of all boardroom positions (see HOLST/SCHIMETA 2011). This gap, formerly 
known as the leaky pipeline, gives rise to the need for a deeper analysis of strategies 
to reduce the inequality of opportunities for women in academia and business.  
An effective tool for overcoming the unequal participation rates of men and women in 
the workforce might be the organizational provision of work-family practices. Alt-
hough over time, men and women appear to have begun dividing domestic work and 
caring responsibilities more equally, women typically spend a larger proportion of 
their time in child-raising and household activities than men (see e.g. SAYER 2005). 
To help women manage the dual burden of work and family, promoting work-family 
practices might be one effective way to minimize the gender bias in highly ranked 
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positions (see PEUS/WELPE 2011). A recent analysis of interviews with human re-
source directors of a dozen companies gives the first indication that one effective ini-
tiative to increase women’s participation in the boardroom is to implement measures 
that facilitate work-life balance (see DESVAUX/DEVILLARD-HOELLINGER/BAUM-
GARTEN 2007).  
Following this train of thought, this doctoral thesis is about the gap and how it might 
be bridged. This thesis tackles issues about gender, the organizational provision of 
work-family practices and productivity. Chapters 2 to 4 focus on corporate business, 
and chapter 5 is about academia. Chapter 2 starts with the performance-enhancing ef-
fects of gender diversity in the boardroom. This chapter shows that only if a critical 
mass of women is reached in the boardroom do companies experience positive perfor-
mance effects. Chapter 3 raises the question of how a company can encourage more 
women to join boards. Signaling a female-friendly organizational culture by winning 
a working mother award increases a company’s chances of attracting female board 
members. Chapter 4 deepens the issues on work-family practices. More precisely, it 
looks at differences in the provision of work-family practices across welfare states and 
industries. It further focuses on the effect of these benefits on extraordinary turnover, 
defined as above average or below average employee turnover per year, country, and 
industry. Chapter 5 is about research productivity in academia. It empirically shows 
that there is a gap between female and male research productivity and analyzes the role 
and the timing of children. The following paragraphs provide further details on the 
particular chapters. 
In chapter 2, joint work with KERSTIN PULL and KARIN VETTER, we look at the perfor-
mance effects of different levels of gender diversity in the boardroom. We postulate 
that there is a U-shaped link between gender diversity and performance, based on crit-
ical mass theory by KANTER (1977a). The critical mass theory stresses the importance 
of different gender compositions in groups and argues that a more gender-diverse 
group performs better. Empirically, we explore whether the link between gender di-
versity and firm performance follows a U-shape with the help of a hand-collected panel 
data set of 151 listed German firms for the years 2000 to 2005. We control for reversed 
causality with a random effect estimator and a one year lag of the explanatory variable 
gender diversity measured by the Blau index. We find evidence that gender diversity 
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at first negatively affects firm performance and is associated with higher firm perfor-
mance than completely male boards only after a “critical mass” of about 30 percent 
women has been reached. Given our sample firms, the critical mass of 30 percent 
women translates into an absolute number of about three women on the board and 
hence supports recent studies on a “magic number” of women in the boardroom (see 
e.g. TORCHIA/CALABRÒ/HUSE 2011).  
Chapter 3 is about how to encourage women to join boards and the role of a company’s 
female-friendly culture. Winning a working mother award can serve as highly visible 
signal of a company’s female-friendly culture and help the company to attract highly 
qualified women. Due to the recent implementation of a mandated gender quota for 
boards of publicly traded firms in some European countries, there is a rising demand 
for qualified female board members, and qualified women may potentially choose 
which boards to join. The primary goal of this chapter is to analyze whether a female-
friendly culture affects the percentage of female directors of European corporate 
boards. The theoretical argument is based on the signaling theory of SPENCE (1973). I 
argue that potential female board members look for signals of a female-friendly culture 
and that a company’s having won a working mother award is a signal that the organi-
zation’s culture is female-friendly. Empirically, I find support for my hypothesis de-
rived from signaling theory in a sample of 199 listed companies in different European 
welfare states (Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) for the years 2002–
2011. Methodologically, panel-analytic regressions are used to establish a link from a 
female-friendly culture on the percentage of female board members in four different 
European countries. By using the fixed effects estimators and a lag of three years I find 
that companies that have won a working mother award have more females on their 
boards.  
Not only can the provision of work-family practices lead to a company’s being nomi-
nated for a working mother award and increase the changes to attract women on 
boards, it can also have an employee turnover decreasing effect in organizations. Sev-
eral studies stress the importance of work-family practices (e.g. YANADORI/KATO 
2009; GIARDINI/KABST 2008; PERRY-SMITH/BLUM 2000). In the literature, various 
definitions of work-family practices exist. Flexible working time, daycare services, 
generous vacations and additional maternity leave were predominantly associated with 
work-family practices (see ANDERSON/COFFEY/BYERLY 2002). In chapter 4, these four 
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benefits constitute the work-family practices examined. I compare the provision of 
work-family practices in welfare states and industries and test their impact on extraor-
dinary turnover, defined as above average or below average employee turnover per 
year, country, and industry. Based on institutional theory, the provision of work-family 
practices should differ between welfare states and industries. Further, I argue, based 
on the turnover approach by the efficiency wage models, that work-family practices 
reduce extraordinary employee turnover. To test my hypotheses, I use the same dataset 
as in chapter 3. My data consist of an unbalanced sample of 199 listed firms in Ger-
many, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom for the years 2002 to 2011. Methodo-
logically, I apply Z-statistics and random effect (RE) logit models to compare the pro-
vision of work-family practices across welfare states and industries. To analyze the 
impact of these practices on extraordinary turnover, pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) modelling with robust standard errors, RE estimators and fixed effects (FE) 
estimators are applied. Overall, I find statistically significant differences in the provi-
sion of work-family practices such as daycare services across welfare states and indus-
tries. Moreover, the results show that practices such as providing daycare services re-
duce extraordinary employee turnover whereas other practices (such as offering flexi-
ble working time and generous employee leave benefits) have no effects. 
In the literature, having children has generally been viewed as a barrier to female em-
ployment (see UUNK/KALMIJN/MUFFELS 2005). The major assumption that underlies 
this view is the incompatibility of maintaining a family and employment and a division 
of household responsibilities according to gender (see FINDEISEN 2011; SAYER 2005). 
In chapter 5, joint work with KERSTIN PULL and USCHI BACKES-GELLNER, we focus 
on the effects of children on female productivity in an academic context. Although 
childbearing is time-consuming (i.e. associated with a negative resource effect), fe-
male researchers with children apparently manage to compensate for the negative re-
source effect associated with childbearing by working harder (positive incentive ef-
fect). Further, one could assume that only the most productive female researchers de-
cide to pursue a career in academia and have children at the same time (positive self-
selection effect). The sample consists of more than 400 researchers in business and 
economics from Austria, Germany, and the German-speaking part of Switzerland. Em-
pirically, we analyze the effect of children and the timing of parenthood on research 
productivity via an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with robust standard errors. 
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We find that female researchers with children are more productive than female re-
searchers without children. Referring to the timing of parenthood, we find that mothers 
who give birth to their first child after tenure are more productive than others. If we 
look at the research productivity of female researchers in the time period five years 
before giving birth to their first child and five years afterwards, we find that research 
productivity increases after childbirth, suggesting that perhaps only the most produc-
tive female researchers with children dare to self-select (or be selected) into academic 
careers.  
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion. First, a summary of the results of the different chap-
ters is given. Second, based on these findings, practical implications are presented. 
Finally, this chapter includes general remarks on the data and methods used in this 
dissertation as well as suggestions for further research.  
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2. Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What 
Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass”? 
 
Chapter 2 is a slightly modified version of the paper “Gender Diversity in the Board-
room and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass”?” by Jas-
min Joecks, Kerstin Pull and Karin Vetter. This paper has been published in Journal 
of Business Ethics 118(2013)1: 61-72. 
 
Abstract: The under-representation of women on boards is a heavily discussed topic 
– not only in Germany. Based on critical mass theory and with the help of a hand-
collected panel data set of 151 listed German firms for the years 2000-2005, we ex-
plore whether the link between gender diversity and firm performance follows a U-
shape. Controlling for reversed causality, we find evidence for gender diversity to at 
first negatively affect firm performance and – only after a “critical mass” of about 30 
percent women has been reached – to be associated with higher firm performance than 
completely male boards. Given our sample firms, the critical mass of 30 percent 
women translates into an absolute number of about three women on the board and 
hence supports recent studies on a corresponding “magic number” of women in the 
boardroom.  
Keywords: diversity, gender, supervisory board, performance 
JEL-Code: G30; J16
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2.1 Introduction 
In the popular press, the representation of women on boards is heavily discussed (see 
HOLST/SCHIMETA 2011; KONRAD/KRAMER 2006). Not only in Germany male manag-
ers regularly hold the vast majority of board positions, and compared to the increase 
of the overall percentage of women in the workforce during the last decades, the rep-
resentation of female directors in the boardroom falls far behind (see FARRELL/HERSCH 
2005: 86).  
Not surprisingly then, in many countries, there has been a pressure for governance 
reforms that may foster gender diversity in the boardroom. Norway was one of the first 
countries to impose a law in 2003 requiring public-limited companies to fill at least 40 
percent of board positions with women by 2008 (see AHERN/DITTMAR 2012; 
HOLST/SCHIMETA 2011: 7). Spain followed Norway’s example and enacted a law pre-
scribing a 40 percent quota of female board members by 2015 (see ADAMS/FERREIRA 
2009: 292). While other European countries, like, e.g., the Netherlands or France, also 
imposed women quotas (see HOLST/SCHIMETA 2011: 11; BÖHREN/STRÖM 2010: 
1282), Germany, focuses on voluntary commitments. The so-called German Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) which asks firms to “comply or explain” with its recommen-
dations states in article 5.4.1:  
“The Supervisory Board shall specify concrete objectives re-
garding its composition which … take into account the inter-
national activities of the enterprise … and diversity. These 
concrete objectives shall, in particular, stipulate an appropri-
ate degree of female representation.”  
But with on average less than 10 percent women on German supervisory boards in the 
30 largest and most actively traded companies listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange 
(DAX 30) (e.g., HOLST/SCHIMETA 2011), female representation in the boardroom is 
still rather low.  
While fostering female representation in the boardroom for ethical and social reasons 
is beyond dispute, the performance effects of an increased female representation on 
the board are rather ambiguous: While some studies hint at a positive link between 
female representation on the boardroom and firm performance, others find no or even 
a negative link. In our paper, we add to the literature by postulating – based on critical 
mass theory – that the relation between gender diversity and firm performance is U-
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shaped and by providing a first empirical test on this supposition based on a hand-
collected panel data set of 151 listed German firms for the time period 2000-2005.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first present a review of the 
recent literature on the performance effects of gender diversity followed by a review 
and critique of critical mass theory as our basic theoretical point of reference. In the 
following section, we describe our data, variables, and methods. Our findings and anal-
yses are subsequently reported in the following section. In the final section, we con-
clude with a discussion of our results and our paper’s contribution.  
2.2 Literature and Theoretical Starting Point 
2.2.1 The empirical link between gender diversity and performance: 
A literature review 
The empirical evidence on the link between female representation on the board and 
firm performance is controversial (for an overview of the literature see Table 1): While 
some studies find the relation between women on boards and firm performance to be 
positive, others provide evidence of a negative link, and still others do not find a link 
at all.  
While some of the differences may be due to the data stemming from different coun-
tries (with differing board systems) and different time periods (see CAMPBELL/MÍ-
NGUEZ-VERA 2010) or from the use of different performance measures and estimation 
methods (see CAMPBELL/MÍNGUEZ-VERA 2008: 441; RHODE/PACKEL 2014: 399), re-
sults may further be affected by studies being confronted with differing ratios of 
women on boards, i.e., there may be studies with overall rather low female represen-
tation and others with rather high female representation. If the link between gender 
diversity and performance was non-linear and, e.g., U-shaped, the first group of studies 
would most likely find the relation between gender diversity and performance to be 
negative, the latter group would find it to be positive. To the contrary, a study that 
covers boards with very low and very high female representations and that searches 
for a linear relation between gender diversity and performance, would most likely find 
no link between the two. 
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Table 1: Overview of the literature (chronological) 
Author(s), 
Year 
Gender di-
versity 
measure 
(explana-
tory  varia-
ble) 
performance 
measure 
(dependent   
variable) 
data base 
(n, country, 
years) 
main result 
Mahadeo, 
Soobaroyen 
and Hanuman 
(2012) 
women’s 
ratio 
ROA 371 directors 
of 39 compa-
nies listed on 
the Stock Ex-
change of 
Mauritius 
(2007) 
positive link 
Ahern and 
Dittmar 
(2012) 
women’s 
ratio 
Tobin’s Q 248 Norwe-
gian public-
limited firms  
(2001-2009) 
negative link 
Lindstaedt, 
Wolff and 
Fehre (2011) 
women’s 
ratio 
ROA, ROE, 
price to 
book value 
160 German 
companies of 
the DAX fam-
ily  
(2002-2010) 
positive link 
for firms 
with a high 
ratio of fe-
male em-
ployees and 
for 
B2C-busi-
ness 
He and Huang 
(2011) 
Blau Index ROA 530 US man-
ufacturing 
firms  
(2001-2007) 
negative link 
Torchia, 
Calabrò and 
Huse (2011) 
no. of 
women; 
four groups: 
(1) no, (2) 
one, (3) 
two, (4) 
three+ 
women 
innovation 
(self-re-
ported) 
317 Norwe-
gian compa-
nies 
(2005/2006) 
three+ 
women are 
positively re-
lated to 
 innovation 
Lückerath-
Rovers, 
(2011) 
women’s 
ratio 
ROE, ROS, 
ROIC 
99 Dutch  
companies  
(2005-2007) 
positive link 
(ROE) 
Böhren and 
Ström (2010) 
women’s 
ratio 
Tobin's Q, 
ROA, ROS 
203 firms in 
Norway listed 
on the Oslo 
Stock 
 exchange  
(1989-2002) 
negative link 
Haslam et al. 
(2010) 
dummy 
(women on 
the board: 
yes / no); 
women’s 
ratio 
ROE, ROA  
Tobin's Q 
126 British 
companies in-
cluded in the 
FTSE 100 
 index  
(2001-2005) 
no link (ROA 
and ROE);  
negative link 
with at least 
one woman 
on board 
 (Tobin’s Q) 
Adams and 
Ferreira 
(2009) 
dummy 
(women on 
the board: 
yes/no); 
women’s 
ratio 
ROA,  
Tobin’s Q 
1939 US 
firms based 
on IIRC 
(1996-2003) 
negative link  
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Source: own compilation. 
Author(s), 
Year 
Gender di-
versity 
measure 
(explana-
tory  varia-
ble) 
performance 
measure 
(dependent   
variable) 
data base 
(n, country, 
years) 
main result 
Miller and del 
Carmen Tri-
ana (2009) 
Blau Index ROI, ROS 326 US For-
tune 500 
firms  
(2003) 
no link 
 
Campbell and 
Mínguez-
Vera, (2008) 
dummy 
(women on 
the board: 
yes/no), 
women’s 
ratio, Blau 
and Shan-
non Index 
Tobin's Q 68 Spanish 
companies  
(1995-2000) 
dummy not 
significant; 
otherwise: 
positive link 
 
Rose (2007) women’s 
ratio 
Tobin's Q more than 100 
Danish com-
panies listed 
on the Copen-
hagen Stock 
Exchange  
(1998-2001) 
no link 
Randöy, Ox-
elheim and 
Thomsen 
(2006) 
women’s 
ratio 
ROA, stock 
market value 
154 Danish, 
144 Norwe-
gian, 161 
Swedish firms 
(2005) 
no link 
Smith, Smith 
and Verner 
(2006) 
women’s 
ratio 
gross profit, 
net sales, 
contribution 
to margin 
sales, oper-
ating in-
come/net as-
sets, net in-
come after 
tax/net as-
sets 
2,500 Danish 
firms (1993-
2001) 
positive link 
depending on 
education of 
women and 
performance 
measure 
Carter, 
Simkins and 
Simpson 
(2003) 
dummy 
(women on 
the board: 
yes / no), 
women’s 
ratio 
ROA,  
Tobin's Q 
638 US For-
tune 1000 
firms  
(1997) 
positive link 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Erhardt, Wer-
bel and 
Shrader(2003) 
minorities’ 
and 
women’s 
ratio 
ROA, ROI 112 US For-
tune 1000 
firms  
(1998) 
positive link 
(demo-
graphic di-
versity 
 included)  
Shrader, 
Blackburn 
and Iles 
(1997) 
women’s 
ratio 
ROS, ROA, 
ROI, ROE 
200 US firms 
(from Wall 
Street Jour-
nal) (1992) 
negative link 
Siciliano, 
(1996) 
women’s 
ratio 
social per-
formance, 
total revenue 
to total ex-
penses, 
 donations 
240 YMCA  
organizations 
(1989) 
no link with 
total revenue 
to total ex-
penses, posi-
tive link with 
social perfor-
mance,  
negative link 
with dona-
tions 
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2.2.2 Critical mass theory: A review and critique 
In our study, we build on KANTER’s (1977a, 1977b) seminal work concerning gender 
diversity in groups: critical mass theory. In her analysis of group interaction processes, 
KANTER constructs four different categories of groups according to their composition: 
uniform groups, skewed groups, tilted groups and balanced groups: 
 Uniform groups are groups in which all members share the same (visible) char-
acteristic. That is, with respect to gender, all members of the group are either 
male or female. Of course, also uniform groups develop their own differentia-
tions, but with reference to salient external master statuses like gender, its 
members are similar (see KANTER 1977a: 208).  
 Skewed groups are groups in which one dominant type (e.g., the males) con-
trols the few (e.g., the females) and therefore also controls the group and its 
culture. The few are called “tokens”. Tokens are not treated as individuals, but 
as representatives for their category (see KANTER 1977a: 208). KANTER sug-
gests that a male dominated skewed group consists of up to 20 percent women.  
 Tilted groups are groups with a less extreme distribution. Unlike in skewed 
groups, minority members can ally and influence the culture of the group. They 
do not stand for all of their kind, instead they represent a subgroup whose mem-
bers are to be differentiated from each other in their skills and abilities (see 
KANTER 1977a: 209). According to KANTER, a male-dominated tilted group 
consists of 20 to 40 percent women. 
 In a so-called balanced group, majority and minority turn into potential sub-
groups where gender based differences become less and less important. The 
focus turns to the different abilities and skills of men and women (see KANTER 
1977a: 209). A balanced group with respect to gender representation has 40 to 
60 percent women.  
Concerning group interaction processes, KANTER regards skewed groups to be espe-
cially problematic: Either the tokens are in the focus or they are overlooked, and they 
may be subject to stereotyping (see KANTER 1977a: 210). For women, there are differ-
ent strategies to cope with a token status (see KANTER 1977b: 968). Either they pretend 
that differences between women and men do not exist, or they hide their individual 
characteristics behind stereotypes (see KANTER 1977a: 239). The incumbent men, too, 
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will also behave differently in skewed as opposed to uniform groups leading skewed 
groups to be outperformed by uniform ones.  
With an increase in their relative numbers from a skewed to a tilted or even a balanced 
group, women are more likely to be individually differentiated from each other. As a 
consequence they might then also bring in their different knowledge-bases and per-
spectives. As is well documented in the literature, men and women differ in a whole 
range of respects: Women are more risk averse than men (see e.g., CROSON/GNEEZY 
2009; NIEDERLE/VESTERLUND 2007; JIANAKOPLOS/BERNASEK 1998), they are less ag-
gressive in their choice of strategy, and more likely to invest in a sustainable way (see 
APESTEGUIA/AZMAT/IRIBERRI 2012; CHARNESS/GNEEZY 2012). Women may hence 
add value to a male-dominated boardroom by providing new perspectives and by ask-
ing different questions (see FARRELL/HERSCH 2005: 87; BURGESS/THARENOU 2002: 
40; BURKE 1997: 912). While in a skewed group, these new perspectives may either 
not be adequately expressed by the female tokens or not spotted by the dominant 
males, in tilted or balanced groups, the combination of female and male attributes will 
more likely allow for productive discussions and will hence positively affect group 
performance (see APESTEGUIA/AZMAT/IRIBERRI 2012; KONRAD/KRAMER 2006).  
In sum, critical mass theory postulates that, until a certain threshold or “critical mass” 
of women in a group is reached, the focus of the group members is not on the different 
abilities and skills that women bring into the group. As a consequence, skewed groups 
will have a lower performance than uniform or tilted and balanced groups. Tilted 
groups – i.e., groups where a critical mass of 20 to 40 percent women has been reached 
– will outperform uniform and skewed groups. 
Despite its popularity, critical mass theory has rarely been put to an empirical test. 
While studies on gender diversity often explicitly refer to KANTER (see e.g., 
TSUI/EGAN/O’REILLY 1992), they rarely directly test KANTER’s predictions on the per-
formance of different group types. Among the few exceptions are SPANGLER/GOR-
DON/PIPKIN (1978) and FENWICK/NEAL (2001). While the latter provide empirical sup-
port for KANTER’s theory and find tilted groups in a student simulation study to out-
perform skewed and uniform ones, SPANGLER/GORDON/PIPKIN (1978) find achieve-
ments of women law students to be diminished in skewed as opposed to tilted student 
work groups. Both, SPANGLER/GORDON/PIPKIN (1978) and FENWICK/NEAL (2001), are 
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confined to simple mean comparisons and do not substantiate their results with the 
help of a multivariate analysis.  
We do not only add to the existing literature by testing KANTER’s predictions in a 
business context and by combining our univariate findings with a multivariate regres-
sion analysis, but also explicitly address the fact that the “critical mass” in KANTER’s 
theory is exogenously – and rather arbitrarily – defined to lie in a range of 20 to 40 
percent women (for a corresponding criticism see CHILDS/KROOK 2009, 2008, 2006; 
CELIS et al. 2008; GREY 2006). Unlike the preceding literature, we attempt to endoge-
nously determine the critical mass of women in the boardroom by regressing firm per-
formance on gender diversity and including a quadratic term. Allowing for non-line-
arities, we expect to find a U-shaped link between gender diversity and performance. 
Finding such a U-shaped link would support KANTER’s theory of a critical mass, but 
at the same time highlight the need to endogenously determine the critical mass of 
women in the boardroom. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Sample 
Our initial sample consists of all 160 companies listed in one of the German stock 
exchange indices DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX on December, 31st 2005. We 
exclude 9 firms that were not of German legal form in order to make sure that all 
companies in the sample were subject to the same regulatory environment. Our sample 
hence consists of 151 companies whom we observe over a five year period (2000-
2005). 
The board system in Germany is a two-tier system with the supervisory board appoint-
ing and supervising management (see DITTMANN/MAUG/SCHNEIDER 2010: 41). Unlike 
in a one-tier board system, the main responsibility of the German supervisory board is 
to monitor, supervise and appoint the management board which in turn is responsible 
for firm operations. German supervisory boards comprise directors elected by share-
holders and, depending on their size, also by employee representatives.  
2.3.2 Variables and data sources 
Concerning the dependent variable, similar to other studies that analyze the relation 
between women on boards and firm performance (see e.g., LIND-
STAEDT/WOLFF/FEHRE 2011; HASLAM et al. 2010; SHRADER/BLACKBURN/ILES 1997), 
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we measure firm performance in terms of return on equity (ROE). The data on ROE 
are taken from Thomson Financial Datastream.  
With respect to our central explanatory variable, gender diversity, we hand-collected 
data on board members’ gender from firms’ annual reports on the basis of board mem-
bers’ first given names. We found none of the boards to be female dominated, i.e., 
there were no boards with more than 50 percent women.  
With respect to KANTER (1977), we first created four dummy variables reflecting the 
different group types: uniform board (assuming the value “1” if a board has no woman; 
“0” otherwise), skewed board (assuming the value “1” if a board has at least one 
woman but less than 20 percent women; “0” otherwise), tilted board (assuming the 
value”1” if the ratio of women in the boardroom is at least 20 percent, but less than 40 
percent; “0” otherwise) and balanced board (assuming the value “1” if the ratio of 
women is at least 40 percent).  
In search for an endogenous determination of the critical mass of women in the board-
room, we further calculated a measure of gender diversity. As one of the most wide 
spread diversity measures for categorical variables (see e.g., BEAR/RAHMAN/POST 
2010; WEBBER/DONAHUE 2001; HAMBRICK/CHO/CHEN 1996; MAGJUKA/BALDWIN 
1991), we used the so-called Blau index of diversity. Following BLAU (1977), diversity 
of a group is given by  
 


k
c
csH
1
2-1 , 
where k stands for the number of categories (i.e., k=2 in the case of gender) and sc is 
the fraction of supervisory board members with characteristic c (i.e. the fraction of 
female/male supervisory board members). Following ALEXANDER et al. (1995) we 
standardize the index such that H=0 signifies complete homogeneity (i.e., all board 
members are male) and H=1 indicates complete heterogeneity (i.e., one half of all 
board members is female and the other is male). In order to account for potential non-
linearities, the Blau index of gender heterogeneity does not only enter our regression 
in its linear but also in its quadratic form.  
As controls, besides year and industry dummies and in accordance with the literature 
(see e.g., LINDSTAEDT/WOLFF/FEHRE 2011, BERMIG/FRICK 2010), we include a firm’s 
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market value as well as a dummy variable for the use of the German accounting stand-
ard HGB1 as both are obviously apt to influence our dependent variable ROE. Further, 
and again in accordance with the literature, we control for a set of board related varia-
bles: board size (see LÜCKERATH-ROVERS 2011, ADAMS/FERREIRA 2009, or FAR-
RELL/HERSCH 2005), codetermination (see LINDSTAEDT/WOLFF/FEHRE 2011; OEHM-
ICHEN/RAPP/WOLFF 2010; FAUVER/FUERST 2006), and multiple directorships (see e.g., 
LINDSTAEDT/WOLFF/FEHRE 2011). Board size is measured by the number of members 
on the board and potentially related to gender diversity in the boardroom. Codetermi-
nation is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the board is code-
termined (i.e., besides shareholders’ representatives there are also employee represent-
atives on the board) and “0” otherwise. Codetermination might be related to our de-
pendent variable ROE (see e.g., BERMIG/FRICK 2011b) and – as ARNEGGER et al. 
(2010) have shown – potentially also to gender diversity. Finally, the variable “multi-
ple directorships” is calculated as the average number of board memberships a board 
member holds besides the one in the board under consideration. Again, this variable 
might well affect ROE (positively due to further board member’ experience; 
SARKAR/SARKAR 2009, or negatively because of time constraints; FICH/SHIVDASANI 
2006) and it might also relate to gender diversity (see FARRELL/HERSCH 2005: 87). 
Information on the different controls is taken from diverse sources, e.g., Thomson Fi-
nancial Datastream, Deutsche Börse (2010), and firms’ annual reports.  
2.3.3 Analysis 
The central challenge for our empirical analysis is reversed causality as we cannot 
exclude that well-performing firms are more likely to appoint women to their boards 
(see SMITH/SMITH/VERNER 2006: 579) or that women self-select into the boards of 
well performing firms. Further, unobserved factors may influence both, the percentage 
of women on boards and firm performance. To address potential problems of endoge-
neity and in accordance to a similar approach by DITTMANN/MAUG/SCHNEIDER (2010) 
and FARRELL/HERSCH (2005), we use panel estimations and lag our central explana-
tory variable gender diversity by one year. Further, we also lag the board controls 
                                                          
1 Due to the internationalization of the German stock market, more and more German firms switched 
their financial reporting from the local German accounting standard HGB to the IFRS or U.S. GAAP 
during our period of observation. 
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board size, co-determination and multiple directorships as they are potentially related 
to gender diversity.  
In a first step, we compare firm performance for different board types according to 
the classification by KANTER and then analyze the link between board type and firm 
performance in a multivariate regression analysis. In a next step, we regress firm per-
formance on our measure of gender diversity in its linear and also in its quadratic 
term to account for potential non-linearities and to endogenously determine the “crit-
ical mass” of women on the supervisory board. In an attempt to further substantiate 
our results on the critical mass of women in the boardroom, we close with a regres-
sion on the apparent “magic number” of women in the boardroom. In all models, we 
use Ordinary Least Squares estimators (OLS) with robust standard errors and firm 
clusters. As the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) shows the random effects 
estimator (RE) to be more appropriate in all models, we include the lead of the cen-
tral explanatory variable in the regression in order to test for strict exogeneity, and 
find gender diversity to be exogenous in all specifications. We decide against the use 
of fixed effects estimators (FE) because for more than a third of our firm population, 
our main explanatory variable, gender diversity, does not change over time. Accord-
ing to a Hausman test, we further find the random effect estimator to be more effi-
cient than the FE estimator.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptives 
Table 2 contains the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all the variables 
included in our analysis. After the elimination of outliers2, mean ROE in our sample is 
9.42 with a standard deviation of 19.28. The average Blau index of gender diversity is 
.26 corresponding to a ratio of female board members of about 8 percent (only slightly 
increasing in time from about 7 percent in 2000 to about 9 percent in 2005). The Blau 
index of gender diversity in our sample ranges from zero (no women on the supervi-
sory board) to one (half of the members of the supervisory board are women). There 
are no boards in our sample where the ratio of women is larger than 50 percent. 20 
percent of firms in our sample report according to the German standard HGB. Market 
value is on average 5,544.81 million Euros, about three quarters of the firms in our 
                                                          
2 Outliners were defined as having an ROE of either more than 100 or less than -100. 
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sample are codetermined, each board member holds on average about three other di-
rectorships and average board size is 11.4 ranging from 23 to 21.  
As to the industry distribution, the largest percentage of firms in our sample belongs 
to Industrials (28.5 percent) followed by Financials (18.5 percent) and Consumer 
Goods (12.6 percent). Female representation on the board is higher in Financials, Tel-
ecommunication, Pharma & Healthcare and in Consumer Goods, and less prevalent in 
Industrials and Basic Materials. These results are consistent with the literature accord-
ing to which female directors are more often to be found in Consumer Goods or Fi-
nancials than Industrials (see ADAMS/ FERREIRA 2009: 295; BRAMMER/MILLING-
TON/PAVELIN 2009; GROSVOLD/BRAMMER/RAYTON 2007: 353). 
Concerning correlations with our dependent variable ROE, we find it to be slightly 
positively related to market value (r=.05*) and to co-determination (r=.08**), and 
slightly negatively related to multiple directorships (r=-.13***). Consistent with our 
theoretical prediction, we do not find an indication for a linear relationship between 
ROE and gender diversity. 
                                                          
3 According to the Stock Cooperation Act (Aktiengesetz), German supervisory boards have a mini-
mum size of three and a maximum of 21 seats depending on statutory equity capital. A supervisory 
board consisting of only two members hints at a temporary vacancy. 
2. Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical 
Mass”? 
18 
 
Table 2: Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
Variables Mean Sd (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) ROE 9.42 19.28 1      
(2) Gender 
diversity(t-1) 
.26 .28 -.01 1     
(3) Ger-
man 
standard 
.20 .40 .04 -.04 1    
(4) Mar-
ket value 
5,545 12,667 .05* .14*** -.07** 1   
(5) Code-
termina-
tion(t-1) 
.72 .45 .08** .33*** .09*** .23*** 1  
(6) Mul-
tiple Di-
rector-
ships(t-1) 
3.40 1.30 -.13*** .28*** .05 -.00 -.30 1 
(7) Board 
size(t-1) 
11.45 6.10 -.02 .27*** -.06* .48*** .67*** -.09** 
Variables: ROE (return on equity); gender diversity: normalized Blau Index ranging from 0 (only male 
directors) to 1(equal distribution); German standard: use of HGB as accounting standard (“1” if firm 
uses HGB, “0” otherwise); market value (in million Euros); codetermination ( “1” if there are employee 
representatives on the board, “0” otherwise); multiple directorships: average number of (additional) 
directorships per director; board size (number of directors on the board). 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: own compilation. 
As to potential interrelations with our main explanatory variable gender diversity, we 
find it to be positively related to market value (r=.14***), co-determination (.33***), 
multiple directorships (r=.28***), and board size (r=.27***). That is, firms with a 
larger market value are characterized by a (slightly) higher degree of gender diversity 
in the boardroom. The same is true for codetermined firms as opposed to non-codeter-
mined firms. Further, gender diversity in the boardroom is positively related to multi-
ple directorships as well as to board size. That is, larger and more experienced boards 
have, on average, more women.  
Concerning interrelations between the different controls, the most striking correlations 
concern board size: It is strongly positively related with multiple directorships 
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(r=.67***) and with codetermination (r=.48***). In order to test for potential multi-
collinearity, we examined the variance inflation factors (VIF). As all VIF values were 
below 2.58, there is no multicollinearity problem. 
2.4.2 ROE and female board representation: Following KANTER 
(1977) 
Before starting with the regression analysis, in Table 3, we first take a look at the 
average ROE for the different degrees of female participation in supervisory boards 
according to the definition by KANTER (1977a, 1977b). As expected (see 
HOLST/SCHIMETA 2011), the most common groups in our sample are uniform groups 
with n=394 and skewed groups with n=360. Firms with a uniform supervisory board 
(i.e., no female representatives on the board) on average have an ROE of 9.6. Firms 
with a skewed supervisory board (<20 percent females) on average have a significantly 
lower (p<0.05) ROE of 7.7, while firms with a tilted supervisory board (20-40 percent 
females) and those with a balanced supervisory board (>40 percent females) again 
have a higher average ROE (12.3 and 12.4, respectively) with the difference between 
ROE in skewed as opposed to tilted groups being statistically significant in a Mann-
Whitney-Test (p<0.05). That is, there is evidence, that skewed boards perform worse 
than uniform boards, and that tilted boards outperform skewed boards. Hence, if there 
is a “critical mass” of women on supervisory boards that is needed in order for female 
representation to positively affect firm performance, this apparently is reached within 
tilted boards – just as proposed by KANTER. 
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Table 3: Average ROE for different board types according to KANTER 
 
Uniform  
Board(t-1) 
Skewed  
Board(t-1) 
Tilted  
Board(t-1) 
Balanced  
Board(t-1) 
 Mann-Whitney Test 
 z-Statistics z-Statistics z-Statistics z-Statistics 
Average ROE 
9.6054 
(19.9445) 
7.6890 
(18.9063) 
12.2577 
(13.8063) 
12.4160 
(8.0199) 
Skewed Board(t-1) 
(< 20% women) 
2.007**    
Tilted Board(t-1) 
(20–40% women) 
-.657 -2.009**   
Balanced Board(t-1) 
(> 40% women) 
-.078 -.405 .274  
No Observations 394 360 79 5 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Source: own compilation. 
 
Our results from the Mann-Whitney Test are mirrored by subsequently performed OLS 
and RE regression analyses (Table 4) with ROE as the dependent variable and with 
dummy variables for the different types of boards as defined by KANTER (with skewed 
boards representing the reference category) and a set of further controls. Owing to the 
missing values, our sample size is reduced to 140 firms. Concerning controls, we find 
ROE to be positively related to market value and negatively related to board size, while 
the other controls are unrelated to ROE. With respect to the groups as defined by KAN-
TER, we find that firms with a tilted board have a higher ROE than firms with a skewed 
board. The coefficients for the two other group dummies (uniform board and balanced 
board) are not statistically significantly different from zero, i.e., having a completely 
male (uniform) or a balanced board (40-50 percent women) does not contribute to a 
higher ROE as compared to having a skewed board (<20 percent women).  
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Table 4: OLS and RE regression with dummy variables for the different board 
types according to KANTER 
 
Variables 
OLS 
ROE 
RE 
ROE 
Uniform board(t-1) 
 
 
1.2339 
(2.3385) 
3.7659 
(2.3264) 
Tilted board(t-1) 5.3564* 
(3.0855) 
5.7445** 
(3.0855) 
Balanced board(t-1) 
-1.4547 -1.1359 
 (5.0027) (4.1812) 
German standard 3.2169 
(2.3920) 
3.8854 
(1.9858) 
Market value 
.0001* .0002* 
 (.0001) (.0001) 
Codetermination(t-1) 
3.7980 2.6131 
 (3.8734) (3.7311) 
Multiple Directorships(t-1) 
-1.8588 
(1.1983) 
-1.7981 
(1.0999) 
Board size(t-1) 
-.5718* -.4610* 
 (.2546) (.2490) 
Constant 
19.7830*** 
(6.4288) 
17.4468*** 
(6.1943) 
No of obs. 630 
No of groups 140 
Year effects yes 
Industry effects yes 
Firm effects yes 
R² .1144 .1097 
Prob>F 4.03***  
Prob>chi²  *** 
Breusch Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test 
  
Prob>chi²  *** 
Hausman test   
Prob>chi²  ns 
Test of strict exogeneity   
Uniform Board  ns 
Titled Board  ns 
Balanced Board  ns 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Source: own compilation. 
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Concluding, the results hint at a critical mass of women being reached in tilted as op-
posed to skewed groups. Other than pre-defining a critical ratio of female representa-
tion, in what follows, we attempt to endogenously determine the degree of female rep-
resentation on supervisory boards at which a potentially negative effect will turn into 
a positive one by including a linear and a quadratic term of gender diversity into the 
regressions.  
2.4.2 ROE and female board representation: In search of the critical 
mass 
Table 5 shows the results of our OLS and RE estimation with ROE as the dependent 
variable and gender diversity in its linear term (in the a-variants) and also its quadratic 
term (in the b-variants).  
Starting with the controls, our results are quite similar to the regression with the dif-
ferent board types according to KANTER. Market value has a positive impact on per-
formance; whereas, depending on the model, multiple directorships and board size 
have a negative effect.  
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Table 5: OLS and RE regression results with gender diversity in its linear and 
quadratic form 
 OLS RE  
 a b a b 
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE 
Gender diversity(t-1) 
 
  .9193 
(4.2027) 
-4.8109 
(10.0051) 
-3.1656 
(3.6224) 
-18.2132* 
(10.8816) 
Gender diversity²(t-1) 
 
   7.9657 
(12.1226) 
 21.1498* 
(12.5525) 
German standard 
 
2.9982 
(2.3941) 
2.9329 
(2.3824) 
3.6811* 
(1.9839) 
3.6202* 
(1.9679) 
Market value 
 
.0002* 
(.0001) 
.0002* 
(.0001) 
.0002*** 
(.0001) 
.0002** 
(.0001) 
Codetermination(t-1) 
 
3.8506 
(3.8890) 
3.9387 
(3.8940) 
2.8181 
(3.7652) 
3.0081 
(3.7569) 
Multiple directorships(t-1) -1.9697* 
(1.1908) 
-1.9455 
(1.1940) 
-1.9532* 
(1.0925) 
-1.9021* 
(1.0886) 
Board size(t-1) 
 
-.6214** 
(.2466) 
-.5926** 
(.2539) 
-.5637** 
(.2343) 
-.4898** 
(.2414) 
Constant 
21.6896*** 
(6.0213) 
21.5214*** 
(6.0497) 
22.2146*** 
(5.6622) 
21.7679*** 
(5.6809) 
No observations 630 
140 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No groups 
Year effects 
Industry effects 
Firm effects 
R² .1088 .1095 .1042 .1036 
Prob>F *** ***   
Prob>chi²   *** *** 
Breusch Pagan Lagrange  
multiplier test 
    
Prob>chi²   *** *** 
Hausman test     
Prob>chi²   ns ns 
Test of strict exogeneity     
Gender diversity   ns ns 
Gender diversity²    ns 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
Source: own compilation. 
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Concerning the relation between gender diversity and ROE, our RE regression in fact 
confirms it to be non-linear and concave. Figure 1 plots the link between gender di-
versity and ROE according to the RE estimation including the quadratic term (model 
2b in Table 5) and shows it to be U-shaped. The graph displays a global minimum at 
a normalized Blau Index of about 0.4 (corresponding to a share of women on the board 
of about 10 percent) and shows increasing performance levels starting from there. Only 
at a Blau index of about 0.85 (corresponding to a ratio of about 30 percent women on 
the board) ROE reaches the level of uniform boards with only male representatives. 
That is, we find evidence of the “critical mass” of female representatives on the board 
to be reached at a share of about 30 percent. Over and above this threshold, the perfor-
mance of a more diverse board exceeds the one of a completely male board. 
Figure 1: ROE and gender diversity 
 
Source: Own data 
As our finding of a U-shaped relation between gender diversity and firm performance 
does not prove to be robust with respect to other performance measures and/or a dif-
ferent set of controls, our evidence on a “critical mass” of 30 percent female represent-
atives is to be regarded rather tentative. However, as we will show below, our results 
are not only supported by the fact that a 30 percent female representation lies within 
the spectrum of KANTER’s tilted groups but also by the recent literature on a suppos-
edly “magic” number of three women on the board (KONRAD/KRAMER/ERKUT 2008). 
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2.4.3 A magic number? 
With board size in our sample averaging 11.45, the critical percentage of about 30 
percent women on the board translates into an absolute critical mass of on average 
three women. Strikingly, this is exactly what TORCHIA/CALABRÒ/HUSE (2011) find in 
their recent analysis on female board representation and firm innovativeness: When 
there are three or more women on the board, firm innovativeness is higher than when 
there are less than three women on the board. Similarly, based on an interview study 
with 50 women directors and building on KANTER’s theory, KONRAD/KRAMER/ERKUT 
(2008) as well as KONRAD/KRAMER (2006) recently suggested the critical mass of 
women in the boardroom to be equal to three.  
In what follows, we further substantiate our results, linking our analysis to the above 
cited studies. In our analysis, we distinguish firms with (a) no woman on their super-
visory board from firms with (b) one woman on the board, (c) two women on the board, 
and (d) three or more women on the board. One woman on the board (b) corresponds 
to our global minimum of about 10 percent female board representation, and three or 
more women on the board (d) correspond to our critical mass of female board repre-
sentation of about 30 percent. Again, we run OLS and RE regressions (Table 6); the 
reference category is boards with only one woman (b).  
We find that having three or more women on the board significantly increases ROE as 
compared to having only one woman on the board. Unlike the preceding analysis, we 
find this result to be robust to the use of different performance measures (e.g., Tobin’s 
Q or PTBV) and/or control variables. Hence, our study is well in line with the recent 
literature on a critical mass of “three” as the “magic” number of women on the board, 
thus substantiating our preceding analysis. 
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Table 6: OLS and RE regression with dummy variables for different numbers 
of women on the board 
Variables 
OLS 
ROE 
RE 
ROE 
No woman(t-1) 
 
3.8219 
(2.3421)  
 
1.8328 
(2.4364)  
 
2 Women(t-1) 
 
2.7782 
(2.3008) 
 
2.0557 
(1.9627) 
 
3 or more women(t-1) 
 
7.4753** 
(3.2676) 
 
5.1895** 
(2.2620) 
 
German standard 
 
2.7431 
(2.3619) 
 
3.6323 
(1.9734) 
 
Market value 
 
.0001* 
(.0001) 
 
.0002* 
(.0001) 
 
Codetermination(t-1) 
4.0168 
(3.8446) 
 
2.7896 
(3.7514) 
 
Multiple directorships(t-1) 
 
-1.9548* 
(1.1750) 
 
-1.9228* 
(1.0812) 
 
Board size(t-1) 
 
-.6843*** 
(.2579) 
 
-.5445*** 
(.2439) 
 
Constant 20.6137*** 
(6.3650) 
18.5663*** 
(6.0231) 
No observations  630 
No groups 140 
Year effects yes 
Industry effects yes 
Firm effects yes 
R² .1186 .1130 
Prob>F 4.29***  
Prob>chi²  *** 
Breusch Pagan Lagrange  
multiplier test  
 
Prob>chi²  *** 
Hausman test   
Prob>chi²  ns 
Test of strict exogeneity   
No women  ns 
Two women  ns 
At least three women  ns 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.*, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
Source: own compilation. 
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
In our study, we explored the relation between gender diversity in the boardroom and 
firm performance based on critical mass theory. While the existing literature that 
builds on critical mass theory exogenously (and rather arbitrarily) defines the percent-
age of women on boards which is judged to be “critical” as being reached in tilted 
groups with 20-40 percent women, we attempt to determine the critical mass of women 
on boards endogenously by adding a quadratic term into the regression analysis. Fur-
ther, we add to the existing empirical literature on board composition and firm perfor-
mance by explicitly accounting for potential problems of endogeneity with the help of 
a panel data set. Last but not least, our analysis is based on the supervisory boards in 
a dualistic corporate governance system which up to now – for the case of Germany – 
mostly concentrated on the role of employee or bank representatives (see e.g., BER-
MIG/FRICK 2011a; FAUVER/FUERST 2006 for the former and 
DITTMANN/MAUG/SCHNEIDER 2010 for the latter) and where only very recently gender 
issues have been tackled (LINDSTAEDT/WOLFF/FEHRE 2011; OEHM-
ICHEN/RAPP/WOLFF 2010; BERMIG/FRICK 2010).  
In accordance with critical mass theory, we find skewed supervisory boards to be out-
performed by tilted supervisory boards, i.e., we find evidence for the critical mass of 
women in boards to be reached in tilted groups with a percentage share of women 
between 20 and 40 percent. Aiming at an endogenous determination of what represents 
the critical mass of women in the boardroom, we subsequently analyze the relation 
between gender diversity in supervisory boards and firm performance explicitly allow-
ing for non-linearities. In fact, we find evidence for a U-shaped link between gender 
diversity on the board and firm performance: Apparently, it needs a critical mass of 
women on the board in order to realize the advantages a more diverse board may offer. 
We find this critical mass to be in the range of about 30 percent female representation 
on the board – i.e., a clear case against tokenism on boards. Further, we find evidence 
of this critical mass to translate into a “magic” number of three women in the board-
room and hence lend support to the recent studies by TORCHIA/CALABRÒ/HUSE (2011), 
KONRAD/KRAMER/ERKUT (2008) and KONRAD/KRAMER (2006).  
As for the managerial implications of our study, our results suggest that a more gender 
diverse board composition will only enhance performance if diversity is sufficiently 
large (10 + percent female representation) and that only for boards with a critical level 
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of 30+ percent females (3+ women on the board), performance will be over and above 
the one of male boards. At very low levels of gender diversity (below 10 percent fe-
male representation), an increase in diversity might even be associated with reduced 
firm performance.  
Concerning political implications, our study suggests that – unless there are no restric-
tions on the supply side – female representation in the boardroom should be in the 
range of 30+ percent. The question whether a women quota should be legally enforced 
or not, however, goes beyond the scope of our article. Drawing our data from a legal 
context without a women quota, we are not in a position to judge whether the estab-
lished link between board diversity and performance would also exist in a system 
where women were appointed only because of the quota and not because of the 
knowledge and expertise they bring into the board. For example, the study by 
AHERN/DITTMAR (2012) suggests that women who are appointed to a board due to a 
quota are, on average, younger and have less CEO experience than their male counter-
parts – which might in fact hint at restrictions on the supply side of eligible women 
that are ready and qualified to serve on supervisory boards.  
As usual, our study also has several limitations. First, with a period of five years, our 
analysis is based on a quite short time period. Further studies may want to concentrate 
on longitudinal panel data covering a longer time span. Second, we study the link be-
tween board diversity and performance within one special national context (the Ger-
man system with a two-tier board structure and codetermined supervisory boards). As 
GROSVOLD/BRAMMER/RAYTON (2007) stress, the institutional and cultural context 
might be of importance when analysing board diversity and its effects. Hence, further 
studies should incorporate cross-country analyses. 
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3. How to Get Women on Board(s)? The Role of a Company’s Fe-
male Friendly Culture 
 
Abstract: I study whether having won a working mother award increases the chances 
to attract female board members in a company. Recently, mandated gender quotas for 
boards of publicly-traded firms are discussed all over Europe. One of the consequences 
of a mandated gender quota is a rising demand for qualified female board members so 
that women might choose which board they join. Potential female board members 
might look for signals of a female friendly culture. Having won a working mother 
award can show a female friendly culture in an organization and therefore increases 
the percentage of female board members. I find support for my hypothesis using a 
sample of 199 listed companies in different European welfare states (Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom) from 2002–2011. 
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Award, corporate culture, corporate governance, quota, women 
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3.1 Introduction 
During the last few decades, there has been a growing public interest in the represen-
tation of women on boards (see HOLST/KIRSCH 2014; KONRAD/KRAMER 2006). Re-
cently, there have been intense debates on women quota laws in European countries. 
To foster a growing representation of women on corporate boards, many European 
countries have already enacted fixed women quotas for corporate listed companies. 
Since Norway imposed a law in 2003 requiring public-limited companies to fill at least 
40 percent of their board positions with women by 2008 (see AHERN/DITTMAR 2012), 
more and more countries have instituted women quotas for listed companies (see AD-
AMS/KIRCHMEIER 2013).  
To comply with the law, companies increasingly face the challenge of attracting qual-
ified potential female board members. Since qualified women in the top ranks are cur-
rently scarce (see FARRELL/HERSCH 2005), companies may have problems in finding 
qualified female board members to ensure a fixed women quota- as the Norwegian 
examples shows. According to AHERN/DITTMAR (2012), the newly appointed female 
directors in Norway are wives, daughters or sisters of existing directors or they are 
former female directors with multiple directorships, which indicates that it is difficult 
to attract qualified female candidates. This suggests that targeting a high percentage of 
women in corporate boards by enacting a women quota does not fully address the un-
derlying causes of female underrepresentation in corporate leadership. Therefore, it is 
important to have a good understanding of how to make a board position attractive for 
women. 
Studies investigating the reasons why directors accept or refuse particular board mem-
berships find that these reasons differ between female and male directors. According 
to MOHAN (2014), one reason for the underrepresentation of women in corporate 
boards is that a career in a publicly traded corporation is not attractive enough for 
women, and that they decide against a boardroom position. The resulting question is 
what makes a boardroom position attractive for women. In their qualitative study, 
SETHI/SWANSON/HARRIGAN (1984) find fit with spouse and children as an important 
reason for female directors joining a board in the US. The McKinsey study by 
DESVAUX/DEVILLARD/SANCIER-SULTAN (2010) also finds programs that help to rec-
oncile work and family life are one effective way to achieve a higher representation at 
the top of European corporations. In sum, potential female board members who have 
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choices about a boardroom position might be more likely to choose companies that 
support the compatibility of work and family.  
The primary goal of this paper is to analyze if and how companies can attract female 
board members by signaling a female friendly culture. Theoretically, having won a 
working mother award might act as a signal to potential female directors, indicating 
that the firm pays attention to a female friendly culture. Empirically, I analyze whether 
companies that have won a working mother award have a higher percentage of female 
directors in their corporate boards using a sample of 199 publicly traded companies in 
four different European countries (Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom) 
from 2002–2011.  
The structure of the paper is organized in the following manner. In section 2, I review 
the relevant literature on what determines the percentage of women on corporate 
boards. Section 3 derives the hypothesis regarding the relation between having won a 
working mother award and the percentage of female directors using a reversed signal-
ing approach. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics and the results of the empirical 
model. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Previous research has put forward a number of reasons why to nominate women to 
corporate boards. As noted by TERJESEN/SEALY/SINGH (2009), the vast majority of 
studies investigating women on corporate boards consider female representation on 
boards of directors to be exogenous, and focus on the outcomes. Besides ethical and 
social issues, women bring different abilities, perspectives, and values into the board-
room, which have been shown to potentially enhance performance (for a review see 
POST/BYRON 2014; JOECKS/PULL/VETTER 2013). Also, firm reputation might be pos-
itively affected (see WILLIAMS 2003; BRAMMER/MILLINGTON/PAVELIN 2009; 
BEAR/RAHMANN/POST 2010).  
In addition, other researchers have focused on the underlying mechanism why there 
might be a relation between women on corporate boards and firm performance. Some 
studies focus on the characteristics of female board members and find women to have 
a more “questioning attitude” (HUSE/NIELSEN/HAGEN 2009) and a more process-ori-
ented working style (see HUSE/MINICHILLI/SCHONING 2005). Regarding the demo-
graphic characteristics for example, RUIGROK/PECK/TACHEVA (2007) find that female 
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board members on Swiss corporate boards are younger and less educated than their 
male board members. This result is in line with findings by AHERN/DITTMAR (2012). 
They report that due to the quota regulations boards of Norwegian listed companies 
consist of younger and less experienced board members. The difference between male 
and female board members might be an indication for the problems companies face in 
finding qualified female board members to ensure a mandated women quota.  
To date there is little empirical evidence on the question how a company might in-
crease their chances to attract female board members. A limited number of studies 
have shed light on the determinants of a higher female representation on corporate 
boards. These studies consider the determinants associated with the likelihood of 
women being added to corporate boards. They emphasize the importance of firm size, 
board composition, and industry sector on higher female representation on corporate 
boards. For example, HILLMANN/SHROPSHIRE/CANNELLA (2007) and GEIGER/MARLIN 
(2012) provide evidence of an impact of organizational size on the likelihood of female 
representation on boards of directors for U.S. companies. In the European context, 
NEKHILI/GATFAOUI (2013) find a positive relationship between women directors and 
board size in a sample of French firms.  
While the existing empirical research only very recently focus on the determinants of 
a higher representation of women on boards, my study contributes to the literature by 
looking at the role of a female friendly culture. Due to internal preferences and external 
pressure on companies, there will be a rising demand for potential female board mem-
bers. However, companies might face availability constraints; since studies from Nor-
way show women at the very top of the corporate hierarchy are still scarce (see 
AHERN/DITTMAR 2012). Women might have choices regarding whether to serve on a 
board. A female-oriented culture might increase the chances to attract female board 
members in a company. I extend existing literature by taking into account winning a 
working mother award as a signal for a female friendly culture for potential female 
directors. Such a perspective will allow companies to attract potential female board 
members in the future. 
3.3 Hypothesis 
A common argumentation is that a barrier for a higher representation of women on 
corporate boards is that women are excluded due to the organizational culture. Indeed, 
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most research finds empirical evidence that gender stereotypes and prejudiced atti-
tudes play a role in explaining the low number of women on corporate boards (see e.g., 
OAKLEY 2000). However, women also often voluntarily decide against a corporate 
management position because they are not attracted to them (see MOHAN 2014). 
Women have a preference for a particular working culture (see VAN VIANEN/FISCHER 
2002: 316). Given the increasing demand for more women in the boardroom, qualified 
potential female board members will have a choice to select the most attractive firms. 
Self-selection, in terms of motives, preferences, or self-views, may eventually play an 
equally or even more important role when it comes to the appointment of women on 
boards than selection by others. According to JUDGE/CABLE (1997), persons are at-
tracted to organizations that share similar values, needs, and preferences. Perceived 
person organization fit is important for the effective socialization of team members 
(see BRADDY/MEADE/KROUSTALIS 2006). The study by THOMAS/WISE (1999) on fe-
male and male MBA candidates indicate that female professionals value diversity 
more highly than males did in their assessments of an organization’s attractiveness. A 
recent analysis of interviews with human resource directors of a dozen companies re-
vealed that one of the most effective initiatives to increase women’s participation in 
the boardroom is to implement measures to facilitate the work-life balance (see 
DESVAUX/DEVILLARD-HOELLINGER/BAUMGARTEN 2007). These studies stress the im-
portance of self-selection of potential female board members in a company that signals 
a culture congruent with their own preferences. 
In theory, work-family conflicts apply to both sexes alike, but they continue to place 
additional challenges on working women. According to the theory on social structure 
of the family (see PARSONS 1949), individuals learn from childhood to adapt to certain 
roles. Women are responsible for family and housework, whereas men specialize in 
work. PARSONS/BALES (1955) argue that due to the biological fact that women bear 
children, the functional asymmetry of gender roles is inevitable. Women consider do-
mestic work and child care responsibilities to be more important than enhancing a ca-
reer. Therefore, women more often interrupt their working lives in order to fulfill their 
domestic duties and child-rearing (see BARNETT/HYDE 2001: 782). Further recent 
studies on the division of domestic work and caring responsibilities show that mothers 
typically invest more time in child raising and household activities than fathers (see 
e.g., FINDEISEN 2011; SAYER 2005). Because the majority of household activities are 
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fulfilled by women, female employees demand a higher degree of flexibility in their 
professional lives and value practices that combine work and family to a greater extent 
than male employees.  
Organizational culture in the boardroom can be described as masculine orientated e.g., 
competition, individualism, and the prioritization of career over family is valued (see 
ROSENER 1995; WILSON 1998). Male directors might expect different experiences in 
their professional life compared to female directors (see GANESH/GANESH 2014). Re-
cent studies show that women have weaker preferences for a competitive environment 
compared to men (see e.g. CATANZARO/MOORE/MARSHALL 2010; NIEDERLE/VESTER-
LUND 2007; VAN VIANEN/FISCHER 2002). According to MAIER (1999), in a feminine-
oriented culture, there is an emphasis on maintaining balance in life activities. The 
central conclusion drawn from this literature is that culture in the boardroom is based 
on organizational practices that promote images of leadership, views of self, and forms 
of communication that are more frequently adhered to by male directors than by female 
directors.  
In the original signaling model, SPENCE (1973) noted how employees can invest in 
signals that disclose their non-observable quality to employers. SCHMIDTKE (2002) and 
BACKES-GELLNER/TUOR (2010) reversed the original signaling model and explained 
how companies can send signals of a non-observable culture in a company and there-
fore attract potential employees. For example, they argue that the observable charac-
teristic of the existence of apprenticeship training can be a signal for non-observable 
characteristics, such as career prospects and interesting tasks at the workplace. In what 
follows, I apply the model of reversed signaling to the context of a female-oriented 
culture.  
To apply the reversed signaling model, the following conditions must hold. The first 
condition is that a firm’s characteristics are not directly observable, e.g., potential fe-
male directors cannot observe directly if a company is female friendly. Indeed, for 
potential female members, it is difficult to observe a female friendly culture, and it 
becomes apparent only after they have worked on the board for some time. The second 
condition is that it is not easy to reliably communicate a female friendly culture at a 
firm. The third condition concerns the risk to the potential female board member to 
accept a board position without reliable information on the non-observable character-
istic of a female friendly culture. Female employees expect values, such as intrinsic 
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significance, social significance, and meaning at their workplace (see SCHWARTZ 
1989: 67f.). This means there might be a board position where these values are fulfilled 
and others where they are not. This assumption implies that a woman has at least two 
offers to join a board (i.e., which would seem to be a reasonable assumption), and she 
must choose between them. The choice of a board position allows potential female 
board members to reduce their risk by looking for signals of a female friendly culture. 
Therefore, the company might want to send a signal of a female friendly culture.  
A signal of a female friendly culture might be the having won a working mother award. 
Different magazines, such as Working Mother or BusinessWeek nominate companies 
on different criteria, such as flexible working time, daycare services, and employee 
leave (e.g., additional maternity leave and generous vacations). Therefore, the ratings 
are based on the external analysis of company policies. The nomination of a working 
mother award might be an effective signal for a female friendly culture for several 
reasons. Whereas flexible working times, daycare services, and employee leave are 
single additive practices, having won a working mother award is an aggregate variable. 
According to BECKER/GERHART (1996), work-family practices become effective when 
they are offered as a bundle. Only companies that fulfill several criteria of family-
friendliness will win a working mother award, so the award might be a good portrayal 
of the company’s culture. Moreover, the process of building a family supportive cul-
ture is not a short-term issue (see GIARDINI/KABST 2008). If a company wins a working 
mother award, it can be assumed that it implemented a bundle of work-family practices 
over a certain time period.  
When assuming that having won a working mother award is a signal for a female 
friendly culture, a few requirements must be met. Firstly, as noted by SPENCE (1973), 
a signal will only be valid if there is a negative correlation between signaling costs and 
non-observable characteristics. The non-observable characteristic under consideration 
is a female friendly culture. Winning a working mother award comes with a cost. The 
costs of producing the signal must be higher for firms without a female friendly culture 
than for those that do have a female friendly culture. Providing many work-family 
practices and being nominated for it is something in which the company must invest. 
Costs can be measured not only in terms of money but also in terms of time. It is not 
possible to invest in this signal for every firm because for example the provision of 
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child care services comes with direct monetary costs. Time is needed for the manage-
ment to implement a bundle of work-family practices. It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that for companies with a less female friendly culture, it might be more time-
consuming and costly to implement work-family practices and getting a nomination 
than for a company with an existing female friendly culture. While implementing var-
ious work-family practices the potential for conflict with the management and the em-
ployees might be much stronger and more frequent for companies with a less female 
friendly culture. Practices such as the provision of child care services in a company 
with a less female friendly culture might not be recognized and utilized by a large 
proportion of the employees. The process of a female friendly culture building is not 
a short-term issue. Only over a longer period of time utilization rates of child care 
services might increase. Secondly, the signal must be observable. A potential female 
board member must be able to easily and reliably find out about if the firm under con-
sideration has won a working mother award or not. This is the case: Companies are 
externally nominated for the award, and if they win it, their homepage will provide 
that information. Thirdly, the signal must be a matter of choice. There is no law that 
requires companies to implement work-family practices and participate in the nomi-
nation process. Even if companies are externally nominated with a working mother 
award, only companies that have developed "portfolios" of work-family practices have 
the chances to win the award. Thus, winning a working mother award is not given and 
might be a signal for a female friendly culture to potential female board members.  
If one expects a working mother award to be an effective signal for a female friendly 
culture, then one would expect firms that have won a working mother award to have 
more women in the boardroom. 
Hypothesis: Companies that have won a working mother award are more likely to 
have a higher percentage of women on their corporate boards. 
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Sample 
The initial sample in my study consisted of an unbalanced panel of 199 listed firms in 
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which I observed over a ten-year 
period (2002-2011). In the sample, 30 firms were listed in the German DAX index, 40 
in the MIB Italy, 29 in the OMX Stockholm, and 100 in the British FTSE100. The four 
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European countries represent, according to ESPING-ANDERSEN (1990, 1999), a wide 
range of different work patterns of men and women as well as benefits provided by the 
state. In addition, whereas the board system in Germany and in Sweden is co-determi-
nated and boards comprise member elected by shareholders and by employee repre-
sentatives, the board system in Italy and the United Kingdom is not co-determinated 
(see ADAMS/KIRCHMEIER 2013). Nevertheless, governmental approaches to increasing 
the representation of women on boards of directors are quite similar in the countries 
included in my analysis (see ADAMS/KIRCHMEIER 2013). All countries refer to a higher 
representation of women on boards in their corporate governance codes; Germany and 
Italy impose a law regarding women quotas by 2015 (see ADAMS/KIRCHMAIER 2013). 
Therefore, the sample consists of composite picture of female representation on cor-
porate boards across a wide range of countries in Europe.  
The data was taken from Asset4, a Thomson Reuters database. This database collects 
information from publicly available sources such as CSR reports, annual reports, and 
company websites. Information on the different controls was taken from diverse 
sources (e.g., Thomson Financial Datastream, DEUTSCHE BÖRSE (2010), and firms’ 
annual reports). 
3.4.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is the percentage of female board members. The central ex-
planatory variable is a dummy variable for having won a working mother award. The 
variable working mother award equals 1 if a company has won a working mother 
award, 0 otherwise. Companies were nominated for the working mother award based 
on four categories: flexible working time, daycare services and employees’ leave (e.g., 
additional maternity leave and generous vacations). Besides using year, country, and 
industry dummies as controls, I also included a set of board- and firm-related variables 
that are correlated with the representation of women on boards according to the liter-
ature: percentage of female managers in a company (see MATSA/MILLER 2011; 
BILIMORIA 2006); board size (see GEIGER/MARLIN 2012; ADAMS/FERREIRA 2009; or 
FARRELL/HERSCH 2005) and founding year (see GEIGER/MARLIN 2012; HILL-
MANN/SHROPSHIRE/CANNELLA 2007). The percentage of female managers might be 
positively related to the number of female directors on the board because female man-
agers in a company may become potential board members. Board size is measured by 
the number of members on the board. The size might be positively related to female 
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board members: Recent empirical literature shows that the larger the board, the higher 
the percentage of women on the board (see GEIGER/MARLIN 2012; ADAMS/FERREIRA 
2009). Regarding founding year, it might be the case that older companies are less 
likely to view women as a valuable and needed resource and are less likely to have 
women on their boards (see GEIGER/MARLIN 2012). The industry dummies are defined 
utilizing the nine supersectors of the Deutsche Börse (2010). Companies are catego-
rized into one of nine supersectors which are: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Con-
sumer Services, Financials, Industrials, Information Technology, Pharma& 
Healthcare, Telecommunication and Utilities.  
3.4.3 Analysis 
In analyzing the impact of the nomination of a working mother award on the percent-
age of female board members, the most challenging point is reversed causality. One 
might argue that female directors are more likely to bring about a change in work 
family politics ultimately leading to a working mother award. To address potential 
causality problems, I use a panel dataset and lag the central explanatory variable nom-
ination with a working mother award by one year and alternatively by three years. 
Using the lag of the explanatory variables helps to identify the direction of causality. 
Even if I cannot fully rule out endogeneity problems for unobservable variables those 
change over time, by using the FE estimator I can control for all unobservable factors 
that are time invariant. First, I use the pooled Ordinary Least Square estimator with 
robust standard errors. I present these results as a benchmark. Since firm fixed effects 
are jointly significant in all estimated models and Hausman tests reject the null hy-
pothesis of no systematic differences with random effects estimates, I only present the 
OLS and the FE estimator.  
In order to provide consistent effects for the coefficients, the strictly exogenous as-
sumption must apply e.g. the lagged variables must be strictly exogenous conditional 
on our independent variables, and the unobserved effects must be uncorrelated not only 
with the error term in the current period but also in the lagged periods. By incorporat-
ing the lead of the endogenous variable in the regression, I test for strict exogeneity. 
As I cannot find the lead of the variable winning a working mother award to have a 
significant effect on the percentage of female board members I conclude that the re-
sults of the FE Modell are consistent.  
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3.5 Results 
Table 7 shows the summary statistics for all variables included in the analysis at firm-
year level. The average percentage of female board members is 13.5 percent ranging 
from 0 percent to 64 percent and doubling in time from about 7 percent in 2002 to 
about 14 percent in 2011. In Sweden, female board members fill on average 21 percent 
of all board seats whereas in Italy female board members only fill on average 2.8 per-
cent of all board seats. These results are similar to the results by TERJESEN/SINGH 
(2008). Their cross country research highlights significant variation across countries, 
i.e. female board representation varies from as low as about 2 percent in Italy to as 
high as about 12 percent in Sweden in 2004. Roughly 5 percent of the companies have 
won a working mother award. The average percentage of female managers in a com-
pany is 24 percent ranging from 0 percent to 79 percent. On average, a board consists 
of about 14 board members ranging from 6 to 28. Founding year varies from 1472 
until 2011. 
As to the industry distribution, more than half of the firms belong to Industrials (23.5 
percent) followed by Financials (22.1 percent) and Consumer Goods (12.5 percent). 
The lowest percentage of female board members can be found in industries of Indus-
trials (9.7 percent) and Basic Materials (5.8 percent). Recent empirical literature also 
finds that female directors are more prevalent in Financials than in Industrials (see 
ADAMS/FERREIRA 2009). 
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Table 7: Summary statistics for all variables at firm-year level 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female board members (%) 734 
 
13.531 10.879 0 63.64 
 
Working mother award(t-1) 
 
687 .068 
 
.253 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Working mother award(t-3) 569 .056 .231 0 1 
Female managers (%) 739 23.744 13.611 .12 79 
Board size 735 13.668 4.023 6 28 
Founding year 732 1926.052 83.256 1472 2011 
Source: own compilation. 
 
Table 8 provides the Pearson correlation matrix of the included variables. Regarding 
the dependent variable percentage of female board members and the central explana-
tory variables having won a working mother award(t-1) and having won a working 
mother award (t-3), there is a positive and statistically significant correlation (r = .12*** 
and r=.13*** respectively). This might be a first hint that having won a working 
mother award increases the percentage of female board members in the long run. Ad-
ditionally, I find statistically significant and positive correlations between the depend-
ent variable percentage of female board members and the control variable percentage 
of female managers (r=.32***). Thus the percentage of female managers seems to in-
crease the percentage of female board members. Interestingly, the control variable 
board size is slightly negatively related with the percentage of female board members 
(r=-.04*) and also the variable founding year is not statistically significantly related to 
my dependent variable. As to potential interrelations, the explanatory variable working 
mother award is positively related to board size (.10***) i.e., larger firms are more 
likely to win a working mother award. There is no correlation with the variable per-
centage of female managers. Concerning interrelations between the different controls, 
there are no striking correlations. In order to test for potential multicollinearity, I ex-
amined the variance inflation factors (VIF). As all VIF values were below 2.37, there 
is no multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 8: Pearson correlation matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Female board members 
(%) 
1      
(2) Working mother 
award(t-1) 
.120*** 1     
(3) Working mother 
award(t-3) 
.126*** .437*** 1    
(4) Female managers (%) .321*** .027 .068 1   
(5) Board size -.044* .110*** .121*** -.131*** 1  
(6) Founding year .004 -.005 .008 .084** -.060** 1 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1  
Source: own compilation. 
Figure 2 displays the percentage of female board members in the time period five years 
before a company has won a working mother award and five years afterwards. As can 
be seen, the percentage of female board members increases after having won a working 
mother award. Whereas the graph renders first tentative hints of a positive effect of 
having won a working mother award on the percentage of female board members, the 
following regression analyses take further potential time trends and control variables 
into account.  
Figure 2: Percentage of female board members before the company won a 
working mother award and afterwards 
Source: own data 
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Table 9 shows the main results of the OLS and FE estimation with the percentage of 
females on boards as the dependent variable. As a result of missing values I have n= 
675 observations when lagging the explanatory variable having won a working mother 
award for one year and n=559 observations when lagging it for three years. Starting 
with the controls, depending on the model and the lag, the results are similar to previ-
ous studies. Both, the percentage of female managers (see BILIMORIA 2006) and board 
size (see GEIGER/MARLIN 2012; NEKHILI/GATFAOUI 2013) are positively related to the 
percentage of female directors on boards. Furthermore, I find significant industry, 
country, and year effects.  
The hypothesis suggests that companies that win a working mother award are more 
likely to have a higher percentage of women in their corporate boards. In models with 
a lag of one year, I find no significant effect of having won a working mother award 
on the percentage of female employees. In models with a lag of three years, I find a 
positive effect of having won a working mother award on the percentage of female 
board members. Therefore, concerning the positive linear relation between the nomi-
nation with a working mother award and female board members, the regression results 
partly confirm the hypothesis. Companies that have won a working mother award have 
more female directors on their boards three years later.  
For further robustness of the results, I ran several alternative analyses. First, I ran the 
regression models with a lag of two and alternatively with a lag of four years in the 
explanatory variable working mother award. I find insignificant effects for the lag of 
two years. The results of the model with a lag of four years lead to similar conclusions 
than the lag of three years indicating the direction of causality. The positive effect on 
the percentage of female board members for a larger time lag might be explained by 
the fact that board members are also appointed to a board with a certain time lag e.g. 
approximately every four years in the German context (see §102, Stock Cooperation 
Act (AKTIENGESETZ 2010)). These findings reflect that the change in particular board 
compositions needs some time to be influenced by a working mother award. 
Second, I conduct the same regressions with the number of female board members 
instead of the percentage of female board members. The results with the number of 
female board members as the dependent variable do not differ in their sign and signif-
icance level. 
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Table 9: OLS and FE regression results 
 OLS FE 
 Female board 
members (%) 
Female board 
members (%) 
Female board 
members (%) 
Female board 
members (%) 
Working  3.595  .323  
mother 
award(t-1) 
(1.40)  (.16)  
     
Working   4.285*  2.345** 
mother 
award(t-3) 
 (1.80)  (2.33) 
     
Female  .171** .184** -.076 -.075 
managers (%) (2.20) (2.47) (-1.45) (-1.13) 
     
Board size -.050 -.041 .257 .417* 
 (-.42) (-.31) (1.59) (1.82) 
     
Founding .005 .001 . . 
year (.98) (.28) . . 
     
Swedena 12.66*** 13.56*** . . 
 (6.10) (6.70) . . 
     
Italy -8.658*** -7.677*** . . 
 (-6.47) (-5.93) . . 
     
United King-
dom 
1.260 
(.85) 
2.522* 
(1.72) 
. . 
_cons -6.474 3.036 10.05*** 6.128* 
 (-.63) (.31) (3.81) (1.68) 
Year effects 
Firm and in-
dustry effects 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
No obs. 
No groups 
R² 
675 
128 
.50 
559 
124 
.53 
675 
128 
.10 
559 
124 
.11 
Prob>F   *** *** 
Hausman Test   *** *** 
a reference country is Germany 
t-statistics are in parentheses.* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Source: own compilation. 
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3.6 Summary and Discussion 
Based on the discussion of a gender quota of the European Commission there might 
be a shortage of qualified female board members in the future in the European boards. 
Little research on women on corporate boards examines determinates of high female 
representation in corporate boards. Previous literature focuses on either outcomes of 
gender diversity or on the characteristics of female board members. The few studies 
that focus on determinants of female representation on corporate boards examine the 
importance of firm size, board composition, and industry sector (see e.g. NEKHILI/GAT-
FAOUI 2013; GEIGER/MARLIN 2012; HILLMANN/SHROPSHIRE/ CANNELLA 2007). Given 
the external pressure for more women on boards, further aspects are gaining im-
portance. Taking a first step to fill this research gap, I adopt a reverse signaling ap-
proach to examine the determinants of female representation on corporate boards, con-
centrating on the effect of having won a working mother award.  
Reversed signaling theory suggests that firms can send signals to recruit and attract 
potential employees or board members respectively. These might look for observable 
signals revealing information on non-observable characteristics. Potential female 
board members might interpret a working mother award as a signal of a female friendly 
culture and self-select into a corresponding board position. Empirically, I find that 
when a firm has won a working mother award, it is more likely to have female board 
members within three years. Although my dataset does not make it possible to directly 
observe the dissemination of work-family practices or whether the award meets the 
demands of potential female directors, my empirical results show consistency with the 
signaling approach. 
In addition, my findings provide support for previous research results that certain or-
ganizational variables, such as board size, have an effect on the female representation 
of corporate boards. Larger board size is associated with a higher percentage of female 
board members. Furthermore, my results also show that female representation on cor-
porate boards varies cross European countries. Although female board members are 
also fairly underrepresented in Sweden, other countries, such as Italy, lag far behind. 
Analyzing cross-country differences as a determinant for higher female representation 
may be an interesting avenue for future research.  
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My findings suggest that if companies experience difficulties in filling their board po-
sitions with qualified female candidates, it can be helpful to create a female friendly 
culture. While these findings provide the first tentative implications for a corporate 
strategy, they also call for more research in this area. Qualitative research is needed to 
understand how potential female board candidates decide on a board position. By re-
cording their attitudes and behaviors, qualitative interviews with female board mem-
bers about their motivation to join a board can provide deeper analyses.  
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4. Comparing the Provision of Work-Family Practices across Wel-
fare States and Industries and Testing Their Impact on Extraordi-
nary Turnover 
 
Abstract: Using a sample of 199 listed companies in different European countries 
(Sweden, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) from 2002–2011, this paper fo-
cuses on the differing provision of work-family practices across welfare states and 
industries and on testing their impact on extraordinary turnover. This study examines 
the effect of these practices on extraordinary employee turnover, defined as above av-
erage or below average employee turnover per year and by country and industry. Dif-
ferences in the provision of work-family practices necessitate recognition and recon-
ciliation as these practices affect employee turnover in the context of country and in-
dustry. The results first show statistically significant differences in the provision of 
work-family practices across welfare states and industries. Second, the findings sup-
port a statistically significant relationship between extraordinary employee turnover 
and certain practices, such as providing daycare services; however, practices including 
generous vacations and additional maternity leave have no effect. Possible endogene-
ity problems are addressed using a longitudinal dataset.  
Keywords 
Turnover, work-family practices, welfare state, industry 
JEL 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the last few decades, the provision of work-family practices in organizations has 
become a highly discussed topic in academic and practical debate (see e.g., 
DEVEN/MOSS 2002; MEYERS/GORNICK 2003). The increase in the percentage of fe-
male employees, single parents, and dual-income couples in the workforce highlight 
the relevance of work-family practices (see PASAMAR/ALEGRE 2014). Due to these 
changes in the workforce, unbalanced relationships between work and family have 
emerged. The incompatibility of work and family often leads to poor performance out-
comes for individual employees, families and organizations (see KALLIATH/BROUGH 
2008). The provision of work-family practices by organizations might be an efficient 
way to allow employees to better reconcile work and family life (see SALTZ-
STEIN/TING/SALTZSTEIN 2001). In this context, it is important to deepen discussion on 
the issue of work-family practices. 
To date, few studies have investigated the conditions that favor the provision of work-
family practices on the organizational level. Previous studies focus on the characteris-
tics of firms adopting work-family practices, such as firm size (see INGRAM/SIMONS 
1995), number of female employees (see POELMANS/CHINCHILLA/CARDONA 2003), 
sector (see DEN DULK et al. 2013) or country (see DEN DULK 2001; DEN DULK/PE-
TERS/POUTSMA 2012). Thus far, industry characteristics have been neglected in this 
discourse.  
Besides external conditions that result in a higher provision of work-family practices, 
positive effects might also motivate companies to further concentrate on these prac-
tices. To measure a company’s success in retaining its workforce, employee turnover 
might serve as an effective barometer (see YANADORI/KATO 2009). Existing empirical 
studies regarding the effect of work-family practices on turnover primarily rely on 
non-European-based data. For a sample of US-companies, BAUGHMAN/DI-
NARDI/HOLTZ-EAKIN (2003) find that work-family practices decrease employee turn-
over. Studies conducted in Asian countries also indicate a negative relationship be-
tween work-family practices and employee turnover, with work-family practices re-
ducing turnover (see e.g., LEE/KIM 2010; NGO/FOLEY/LOI 2009; YANADORI/KATO 
2009). Most empirical studies investigate the impact of work-family practices on em-
ployee turnover using data collected in a single industry within a single country (see 
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e.g. LEE/HONG 2011). Other studies use data on employee turnover from multiple in-
dustries in one country (see e.g., HUSELID 1995; YANADORI/KATO 2009). However, 
very little attention has been paid to the effects of these practices on employee turnover 
across countries and industries. Furthermore, previous studies mainly use cross-sec-
tional data. With cross-sectional data, it is hard to establish a causal relationship be-
tween a company’s provision of work-family practices to reduced employee turnover 
rates. Longitudinal data may address potential endogeneity problems. 
I try to fill the gaps left by earlier research by using a sample from an unbalanced panel 
dataset of 199 listed companies in different European welfare states (Sweden, Ger-
many, Italy and the United Kingdom) and by classifying industries as belonging to 
either the classic or the technology industry4 for the time period between 2002 and 
2011. First, I compare work-family provisions for companies operating in two proto-
typical examples of welfare states (socially- versus liberally-oriented systems) as well 
as for companies operating in either the classic industry or the technology industry. 
Second, I analyze the effectiveness of work-family practices in terms of extraordinary 
employee turnover, defined as above average or below average employee turnover per 
year, by country and industry. With this measure, I attempt to avoid problems in meas-
uring different employee turnover levels across countries and industries. Based on gov-
ernmental regulations (see OECD employment outlook 1993) and different individual 
workers’ preferences mobility (see BLINDER/KRUEGER 1996), the average employee 
turnover varies, and turnover levels differ across industries. The differences in the 
tasks across industries necessitate the need to account for different turnover levels. For 
instance, in the technology industry where many tasks are routinized and require little 
training, high turnover rates are more common and less costly than in the classics in-
dustry where the majority of tasks depend on network information and highly-specific 
skills (see BLINDER/KRUEGER 1996). Third, I address possible endogeneity problems 
by using a longitudinal dataset.  
In the present paper, I distinguish four individual work-family practices: generous va-
cations, flexible working time, daycare services, and additional maternity leave. These 
practices are the most common according to the literature (see e.g. YANADORI/KATO 
2009; BEAUREGARD/HENRY 2009; ARTHUR 2003). My analyses show that depending 
on different practices, the provisions of welfare states and industries differ, as does the 
                                                          
4 Industries are defined according to the Deutsche Börse into classic and technology industries.  
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impact on extraordinary turnover. To better understand the phenomenon, it is crucial 
to focus on the effects of single practices. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Provision of work-family practices across welfare states and in-
dustries 
Institutional theory predicts that organizations will be guided by external sources, such 
as the state or an industry, in implementing work-family practices (see MEYER/ROWAN 
1977). Institutional rules function as assistance in becoming isomorphic with the en-
vironment. Institutional isomorphism occurs through coercive, normative, and mi-
metic institutional pressures (see DIMAGGIO/POWELL 1983; TOLBERT/ZUCKER 1996). 
Coercive pressure is driven by regulatory mechanisms and societal expectations (see 
DIMAGGIO/POWELL 1983). Normative pressure arises through conformity with pro-
fessional standards, and mimetic pressure involves an organization’s response to un-
certainty (see DIMAGGIO/POWELL 1983). According to institutional theory, which 
highlights cultural influences on structures and decision-making (see ZUCKER 1987), 
firms adopt work-family practices to respond to employee needs. Institutional pres-
sures lead to awareness of the need to implement better practices to reconcile work 
and life.  
The country classification by EVANS (2001) and the seminal work of ESPING-ANDER-
SEN (1997; 1999) distinguish four different European welfare states. The four states – 
the “Nordic model”, the “Central European model”, the “Southern European model”, 
and the “Insular model” – attach varying significance to the family, the market, and 
the state. Sweden, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, respectively, serve as 
prototypical examples of these different welfare states. For companies, different wel-
fare states provide different sociopolitical environments, such as legislation on child-
care and leave arrangements. Below, the four welfare states are introduced in terms of 
the social institutions for combining work and family life. 
Nordic model: Sweden represents the Nordic model with its well-developed public 
systems (see GAUTHIER 2002). While public support for work-family practices has 
increased all over Europe, the most extensive national work-life policies are still pro-
vided in Scandinavian countries (see PASAMAR/CABRERA 2013: 963). In these coun-
tries, the state comprehensively regulates family-friendly practices (see EVANS 2001: 
22). In contrast to the Southern European or the Insular model, subsidized formal care 
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services are offered for children at a younger age in Sweden (see THÉVENON 2011). 
The relatively generous benefits offered by public policy enable parents to temporarily 
leave their place of employment after the birth of a child (see THÉVENON 2011).  
Central European model: Germany serves as an example of the Central European 
model. This model is characterized by numerous social protection systems, while pub-
lic policy is marked by “conservatism”. The family is considered a social institution 
protected by the state (see EVANS 2001). A combination of the market, the state and 
the family is responsible for citizens’ welfare. Similar to Nordic countries, state ar-
rangements for childcare are available, but only for children aged three and above. For 
children under the age of three, there is a considerable shortage of public childcare 
services and a lack of full-time services (see THÉVENON 2011; GAUTHIER 2002). Very 
recently, the government introduced a law consolidating daycare for children under 
the age of three in Germany (see BMFSFJ 2015). The aim of the law is to guarantee a 
legal right to public child care through subsidies to all pre-kindergarteners (see 
BMFSFJ 2015). Compared to the Southern European or the Insular model, long peri-
ods of leave characterize parental leave regulations in the central European model (see 
EVANS 2001).  
Southern European model: Italy serves as an example of the Southern European model. 
Family patterns are quite important in Italy, and the family is considered to be respon-
sible for citizens’ welfare. Compared to the Nordic or the Central European model, 
there is comparatively low public support for reconciling work and family. Childcare 
availability varies by the age of the child. Childcare facilities are more common for 
children aged three and above, but in rural areas, even this resource is scarce. Only a 
very limited proportion of Italian families make use of public childcare under the age 
of three. Assistance provided by grandmothers is the more common way to reconcile 
work and family (see DEL BOCA/LOCATELLI/VURI 2005). Traditional work patterns 
are typical for the country: Women tend to stay at home after childbirth, and the tradi-
tional picture of the man as the breadwinner still holds.  
Insular model: The United Kingdom represents the Insular model. Typically in this 
model, the market bears the responsibility for citizens’ welfare. The state interferes 
little in the Insular model, which emphasizes individual freedom and market interven-
tion (see EVANS 2001: 23). The private market offers childcare (see VIITANEN 2005), 
and the state offers few benefits for paid leave following the birth of a child. The period 
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of protected employment is comparatively short, and parental benefits are limited (see 
THÉVENON 2011). 
Table 10: Typology of different welfare states 
Welfare state Socially-oriented Liberally-oriented 
 Model Nordic model:     
e.g. Sweden 
Central European 
model: e.g. Ger-
many  
Southern Euro-
pean model: e.g. 
Italy 
Insular model:    
e.g. the United 
Kingdom  
Responsible social 
institutions for the 
citizens’ welfare 
State Combination of all Family Market 
Source: own compilation. 
Table 10 illustrates the four welfare states and the responsibility of social institutions 
for citizens’ welfare. In Sweden and Germany, public intervention is common, includ-
ing many services relevant to the reconciliation of work and family such as public day 
care services or family leave benefits. In the United Kingdom and Italy, the market or 
the family is considered to be responsible for mediating work and family life. Based 
on the social institution responsible for the citizens’ welfare, countries can be classified 
into socially-oriented or liberally-oriented welfare states. The Nordic and the Central 
European model can be characterized as socially-oriented, whereas the Southern Eu-
ropean model and the Insular model can be characterized as liberally-oriented.  
Institutional theory predicts that companies in the Nordic and Central European mod-
els will adopt more work-family practices than companies operating in the Southern 
European and Insular models. According to ESPING-ANDERSEN (1990; 1997), there is 
almost no state or societal pressure on companies to implement social benefits in the 
Southern European and Insular model.  
Thus, the higher the state support for a combination of work and family life, the higher 
the probability of implementing work-family practices. The first hypothesis (1a) thus 
reads as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Companies operating in socially-oriented welfare states are more 
likely to provide work-family practices than companies operating in liberally-oriented 
welfare states. 
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Similarly, companies operating in different countries adopt different levels of work-
family practices because companies operating in different industries respond to 
changes in family structure differently. Institutional theory stresses the importance of 
external sources. Depending on a company’s industry, employers have to respond to 
the expectations of competitors and suppliers to gain legitimacy (see DIMAGGIO/POW-
ELL 1983; TOLBERT/ZUCKER 1994). Different industry settings might face varying de-
grees of institutional pressure to implement work-family practices. According to 
BLOOM/KRETSCHMER/VAN REENEN (2011), industries may differ in their degree of 
competition. Internal and external pressures may lead to an extended provision of 
work-family practices (see BLOOM/KRETSCHMER/VAN REENEN 2011).  
To classify the wide range of industries for European-listed companies into two 
groups, the Deutsche Börse applies the concept of classic and technology industries, 
which includes nine defined industry groups (basic materials, consumer goods, con-
sumer services, financials, industrials, information technology, pharma& healthcare, 
telecommunication and utilities). Below, the two industry groups are discussed with 
regard to differences in workforce characteristics relevant to the provision of work-
family practices.  
Classic industry: This sector assignment includes companies from traditional sectors 
(“Classic”). They are characterized by a high percentage of female employees in their 
workforce (see MILLIKEN/MARTINS/MORGAN 1998). For example, companies operat-
ing in the consumer services and financials industry are included in the classic indus-
try.  
Technology industry: This sector assignment includes companies from high technol-
ogy sectors (“Technology”). The vast majority of the workforce is male (see MILLI-
KEN/MARTINS/MORGAN 1998). Examples for organizations included in the technology 
industry are communications- and information technology-based organizations as well 
as companies producing high-tech industrial goods or engineering.  
The level of work-family practices can differ to a meaningful degree based on differ-
ences in the industry sectors and countries. One would expect that companies operating 
in the classic industry are more likely to adopt work-family practices than companies 
operating in the technology industry as the institutional pressure to implement work-
family practices might be higher in industries with a higher percentage of women. In 
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summary, public attention, state regulations in certain welfare states, and varying pat-
terns in particular industries mirror the growing institutional pressure on companies to 
implement work-family practices. Therefore, the second hypothesis (1b) is thus: 
Hypothesis 1b: Companies operating in the classic industry are more likely to imple-
ment work-family practices than companies operating in the technology industry.  
4.2.2 Work-family practices and extraordinary employee turnover 
The turnover approach by the efficiency wage models postulates that some companies 
pay higher wages than others in order to reduce employee turnover costs (vgl. STIGLITZ 
1986; KATZ 1986). If employee turnover serves as a decreasing function of compen-
sation, companies pay; if companies bear part of the costs of employee turnover, com-
panies might be incentivized to increase compensation in order to avoid high employee 
turnover. According to the literature (see e.g., BLAU 1964; PFEFFER 1981), the provi-
sion of work-family practices can serve as firm-specific non-monetary compensation. 
The provision of work-family practices can be seen as a symbol of organizational care 
and support for employer’s individual needs (see PFEFFER 1981). The more generous 
the benefits, the more committed the employee to his or her organization because the 
costs of losing his or her job increase. A job that offers flexible working hours and/or 
daycare services is harder to find compared to a job without these options (see SHEP-
ARD/CLIFTON/KRUSE 1996). If all companies were identical, one would not expect to 
see differences in employee turnover, but when companies operate in different indus-
tries and countries, the average annual employee turnover will vary across industries 
and countries. In some countries and industries, it is easier to replace employees with 
better alternatives than in others. This variation occurs either in management capacity 
or in the technology of production (see KRUEGER/SUMMERS 1988). To account for the 
problem of differing degrees of average turnover, it is important to look at extraordi-
nary high or low turnover. Therefore, I take into account the deviation of employee 
turnover, measured as above average or below average employee turnover per year, 
by country and industry. 
Extraordinary turnover takes into account the competitive context within which a firm 
operates. Some companies might have higher levels of turnover in their current com-
petitive situation. For example, the average turnover in the USA is two times larger 
than in Japan, while turnover rates in manufacturing industries are three times lower 
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than in finance industries (see OECD employment outlook 1993). Above or below 
average annual employee turnover is a more detailed measure for the effect of work-
family practices on employee turnover across countries and industries.  
Summing up, work-family practices may serve as a source of sustained competitive 
advantage in companies, thus decreasing extraordinary turnover, which leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Work-family practices reduce extraordinary employee turnover. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Sample and Variables 
The countries in the data set represent a wide range of different welfare states. The 
initial sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 199 listed firms in Germany, Italy, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom for the years 2002 to 2011. In the sample, 30 firms 
are listed in the German DAX index, 40 in the MIB Italy, 29 in the OMX Stockholm 
and 100 in the British FTSE100.5  
Information on the variables is taken from different sources, including Worldscope, 
Asset4 and Deutsche Börse (2010). Worldscope and Asset4 are Thomson Reuter’s da-
tabases collecting information from publicly-available sources, such as CSR reports, 
annual reports and company websites.  
For my analyses, I use two different subsamples of the total sample consisting only of 
those companies for which all variables are available. There were missing values for 
the following variables: work-family practices (18.6 percent of dataset), female em-
ployees (54 percent of dataset), number of employees (6.9 percent of dataset), return 
on equity (8.3 percent of dataset) and employee turnover (72.4 percent of dataset). 
Information on work-family practices, female employees and employee turnover are 
missing because companies report information on these variables on a voluntary basis. 
In the first subsample, a total of 143 companies (844 observations, 42 percent of the 
dataset) have complete data. In the second subsample, I end up using 98 listed Euro-
pean firms and 433 firm observations (22 percent of my dataset). I compare the com-
                                                          
5 This means that the juristic headquarters are located in this particular country or that the index contains 
companies with operating headquarters in this particular country. Information on all variables is taken 
from the headquarters location and not from potential multinational enterprises all over the world.  
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panies in the two different subsamples with those excluded due to missing value infor-
mation and find no differences in the percentage of female employees and performance 
as measured by ROE. The means for the single work-family practices and the number 
of employees are slightly higher in my reduced sample (see Table 11).  
Table 11: Summary statistics for the two samples 
 
Stand. Dev. in parentheses 
I use four variables to assess work-family practices: generous vacations, flexible work-
ing time, daycare services and additional maternity leave. Flexible working time is 
measured using this question: Does the company claim to provide flexible working 
hours or working hours that promote a work-life balance? I create a dummy variable, 
flextime, by coding 1 if the company reports providing flexible working time as a 
work-family practice according to Thomson Reuters, 0 otherwise. The provision of 
generous vacations is measured by the following question: Does the company claim to 
provide generous vacations, career breaks or sabbaticals? Similarly, the dummy var-
iable, vacation, equals 1 if the company reports to provide generous vacations accord-
ing to Thomson Reuters, 0 otherwise. Concerning daycare services, information is 
captured through the following question: Does the company claim to provide daycare 
services for its employees? Based on information from Thomson Reuters, the dummy 
variable of daycare takes a value of 1 if the company provides daycare services, 0 
Variables Obs Mean Obs Mean 
1 Extraordinary 
turnover 
--- --- 433 -.055 
(4.625) 
2a Vacation 844 .152 
(.359) 
433 .159 
(.366) 
2b Flextime 844 .411 
(.492) 
433 .524 
(.500) 
2c Daycare 844 .249 
(.433) 
433 .349 
(.477) 
2d Maternity 
leave  
844 .172 
(.377) 
433 .233 
(.423) 
3 Female employ-
ees (%) 
844 35.918 
(17.199) 
433 32.348 
(16.053) 
4 No. of employ-
ees 
844 69.343 
(95.167) 
433 76.497 
(103.426) 
5 ROE 844  14.721 
(15.469) 
433  13.602 
(14.506) 
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otherwise. To measure additional maternity leave, the following question is used: Does 
the company claim to provide generous maternity leave benefits? The variable of ma-
ternity leave is coded 1 if a company’s maternity leave policy is more generous than 
what is required by law according to Thomson Reuters, 0 otherwise. These four work-
family practices are similar to those used as measures in previous literature (see e.g. 
YANADORI/KATO 2009; GIARDINI/KABST 2008; PERRY-SMITH/BLUM 2000). On aver-
age, the most common offered practice is flexible working time (41 percent for the 
first subsample, 52 percent for the second subsample) followed by daycare services 
(25 percent for the first subsample, 35 percent for the second subsample) and maternity 
leave (17 percent for the first subsample, 23 percent for the second subsample). In both 
samples, an average of 15 percent of the companies provide generous vacations.  
Based on ESPING-ANDERSEN (1990; 1999), I include four European countries in the 
analysis: Sweden, Germany, Italy and Great Britain. Based on state support, Sweden 
and Germany represent a socially-oriented welfare state, and Italy and Great Britain 
represent a liberally-oriented welfare state. In my first subsample, 44 percent of the 
companies operate in a rather socially-oriented welfare state, and 56 percent of the 
companies operate in a rather liberally-oriented welfare state. The proportions are sim-
ilar in my second subsample.  
According to the Deutsche Börse classification of supersectors (2010), nine different 
industry sectors are considered: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, 
financials, industrials, information technology, pharma and healthcare, telecommuni-
cation and utilities. Based on these industry sectors, companies are further classified 
into the classic industry or technology industry category (Deutsche Börse 2010). In 
my first subsample, 64 percent of the companies belong to the classic industry, and 36 
percent of the companies belong to the technology industry. My second subsample has 
a similar composition.  
Employee turnover is assessed by the percentage of employees leaving the company 
during a given year. This measure includes all forms of employee turnover, both vol-
untary separation, such as quitting, and involuntary dismissals, such as firings.6 On 
average, employee turnover is 10.19 percent. To display extraordinary turnover in my 
                                                          
6 This percentage includes all personnel leaving the company; retirements or deaths are excluded. 
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regression analysis, I use country and industry sectors’ standardized turnover. I calcu-
late the deviation of a company’s individual annual turnover based on an average an-
nual turnover from the company’s industry and country. This measure has the ad-
vantage of accounting for country and industry-specific differences in turnover per 
year. Extraordinary employee turnover measures whether or not employee turnover is 
above average or below average for a specific year, country and industry.  
For further illustration, Table 12 presents the average annual employee turnover in 
2011 for my sample. The table distinguishes employee turnover within one country in 
different industry sectors. Depending on the industry sector, companies in Germany 
have the lowest average employee turnover, and companies in United Kingdom have 
the highest. My sample appeas comparable to statistics reported by the OECD outlook 
in 1993. The OECD’s data on employee turnover are derived from household surveys 
in 1991. The surveys asked employees how long they had been working continuously 
for their employer (see OECD outlook 1993: 150). The survey also reports that Ger-
many has a lower employee turnover than the United Kingdom. On average, there is 
also variation in turnover levels across industry sectors. Due to missing values, I do 
not have information on employee turnover for all countries and industries in each 
year.  
Table 12: Breakdown of average employee turnover in each country  
and industry sector for the year 2011 
 Germany Sweden Italy UK 
Basic Materials 8.33 4.5 . 9.38 
Consumer Goods 2.25 16 13.21 3.97 
Consumer Services . 18 14.11 16.62 
Financials 10.33 9.18 5.76 11.24 
Industrials 8.09 13.4 11.96 14.84 
Information Technology 9.4 12.5 . . 
Pharma& Healthcare . 17.4 . 16.25 
Telecommunication 5.4 8.4 9.58 10.96 
Utilities 10.1 . 6.65 10.7 
Source: own compilation. 
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As further controls for the regressions, I include the percentage of female employees 
in accordance with the literature (see e.g. YANADORI/KATO 2009). Depending on the 
composition of a company’s workforce with respect to gender, there is an organiza-
tional culture that potentially supports work-family practices (see e.g. 
POELMANS/CHINCHILLA/CARDONA 2003) and also influences employee turnover (see 
e.g. YANADORI/KATO). Therefore, a relationship might exist between the percentage 
of female employees and my dependent variable extraordinary employee turnover as 
well as work-family practices. In both subsamples, the vast majority of employees are 
male (64.1 percent are male employees in my first subsample and 35.9 percent are 
female employees respectively; 67.65 percent are male employees in my second sub-
sample and 32.35 percent are female employees respectively).  
I further control for the number of employees in a company (see e.g. WOOD/DE 
MENEZES 2010) because the size of a company might affect the provision of work-
family practices. According to INGRAM/SIMONS (1995) there is a positive correlation 
between organizational size and work-family practices. The number of employees 
might also be related to turnover, and it serves as a proxy for firm size. Larger firms 
will face greater company fluctuation as employees are more likely to change their job 
within the company (see LEE et al. 2008). The number of employees is measured in 
the thousands. On average, in my first subsample, there are 69.34 employees. In my 
second subsample, there are an average of 76.50 employees.  
A further control is firm performance (see e.g. HANCOCK et al. 2013; NGO/FOLEY/LOI 
2009). Market related performance is measured by return on equity (ROE). Previous 
research has shown a negative correlation between turnover and market-related per-
formance: the higher the company’s turnover level, the lower firm performance (see 
e.g. HANCOCK et al. 2013; NGO/FOLEY/LOI 2009). In both samples, ROE is about 14 
percent. Finally, I also control for year dummies.  
4.3.2 Analysis 
To identify differences in the provision of work-family practices among companies 
operating in different welfare states and different industries (hypothesis 1), I use Z-
statistics to compare proportions of my binary variables, work-family practices, as a 
first step. As a second step, I use random effect (RE) logit models and include further 
controls.  
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To test whether work-family practices influence extraordinary turnover (hypothesis 2), 
I use pooled OLS modeling with robust standard errors and firm clusters as well as a 
random effects estimator (RE) and fixed effects estimators (FE). For more than a third 
of the firms in my unbalanced dataset, the main explanatory variable, work-family 
practices, does not change over time. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to use the 
FE estimator according to a Hausman test as the random effect estimator provides 
more consistent results. As the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) shows the 
random effects estimator (RE) to be more appropriate than the OLS estimator, I include 
the lead of the central explanatory variable in the regression in order to test for strict 
exogeneity, finding all work-family practices to be exogenous for all specifications. 
However, the RE estimator, as well as the pooled OLS estimator, rely on the problem-
atic assumption that the regressors are not correlated with unobserved heterogeneity 
characteristics. It is not possible to rule out the possibility that some specific unob-
served company heterogeneity is endogenous, thus limiting the causal interpretation. I 
therefore present both the pooled OLS and RE as well as the FE estimation.  
To check for the robustness of the results for the impacts of work-family practices and 
extraordinary employee turnover (hypothesis 2), I also ran the regressions with the 
average annual rate of employee turnover as the dependent variable, finding my results 
to be robust to this alteration in the OLS and RE model7.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Provision of work-family practices across welfare states and in-
dustries 
Hypothesis 1a suggests that companies operating in socially-oriented welfare states 
are more likely to provide work-family practices than companies operating in liberally-
oriented welfare states. Table 13 shows a comparison of single work-family practices 
for different welfare states. The last two columns of Table 13 report the Z-statistics 
and their level of significance for the pairwise comparison test of proportion differ-
ences. Z-statistics for all work-family practices are found to be significant. That is, the 
provision of generous vacations, flexible working time, daycare services and maternity 
leave differs significantly between the countries under consideration. More companies 
                                                          
7 The FE model does not provide significant effect. The reason might be that all time constant varia-
bles are not considered, and only the within estimator is used. 
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operating in Sweden and Germany offer work-family practices, such as flexible work-
ing time and daycare services. These results provide initial tentative support for hy-
pothesis 1a. However, more companies in liberally-oriented states provide work-fam-
ily practices, such as generous vacation or additional maternity leave, which is contrary 
to my hypothesis.  
Table 13: Single work-family practices across welfare states 
Variables 
Socially- ori-
ented 
Liberally- ori-
ented 
Pairwise differ-
ences  
Z-value  
Vacation .090 
(.012)       
 .121  
(.010)       
* 1.856 
Flextime .331 
(.020)       
 .282  
(.014)       
** -2.059 
Daycare .279 
(.019)       
.105  
(.009)       
*** -8.937 
Maternity 
leave  
.090 
(.012)       
 .136  
(.010)       
*** 2.635 
No Obs.  531 1097   
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Stan. Dev.in parentheses.  
Source: own compilation. 
 
Hypothesis H1b suggests that companies operating in the classic industry are more 
likely to provide work-family practices than companies operating in the technology 
industry. To identify differences in work-family practices for different industries, I 
again use Z-statistics to compare proportions of binary variables (see Table 14).  
Table 14: Single work-family practices across industries 
Variables Classic Industry Technology Industry 
Pairwise dif-
ferences 
Z-value 
Vacation  .134  
(.011)       
 .073 
(.011) 
*** -3.801 
Flextime .328 
 (.015)      
 .249  
(.017)       
*** -3.377 
Daycare .190 
(.012)       
.115  
(.013)       
*** -3.938 
Maternity 
leave 
.156  
(.011)       
.063  
(.010)       
*** -5.552 
No Obs.  1013 615   
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Stan. Dev. in parentheses.  
Source: own compilation. 
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The pairwise comparison test of proportion differences shows that all work-family 
practices differ significantly across industries. Companies operating in the classic in-
dustry provide more work-family practices than companies operating in the technol-
ogy industry, therefore providing initial tentative support for Hypothesis 1b. 
The results from the Z-statistics differ slightly from the subsequently performed RE 
Logit regression analyses (see table 15). In these analyses, single work-family prac-
tices are the dependent variables and dummy variables for the different types of wel-
fare states are defined by ESPING-ANDERSEN (with the liberally-oriented state repre-
senting the reference category). The industry classification is based on Deutsche Börse 
(2010) (with the technology industry as a reference category) as well as a set of differ-
ent controls. Because of the missing values primarily in the control variable percentage 
of female employees, my sample size is reduced to 143 firms. With respect to the in-
fluence of welfare states and industries on the provision of single work-family prac-
tices, the results are as follows: The provision of practices, such as vacation and flex-
ible work time, is not influenced by the welfare state or the industry classification. 
Companies operating in the socially-oriented welfare state are more likely to provide 
daycare services than companies operating in the liberally-oriented welfare state. 
Therefore, the results only partially support hypothesis 1a, which states that companies 
operating in socially-oriented welfare states are more likely to provide work-family 
practices than companies operating in liberally-oriented welfare states. Hypothesis 1b 
suggests that companies operating in the classic industry are more likely to provide 
work-family practices than companies operating in the technology industry. The re-
sults partially support this hypothesis. Companies operating in the classic industry are 
more likely to provide daycare services and additional maternity leave. 
Concerning controls, I find the percentage of female employees to be positively related 
to work-family practices such as generous vacation, flexible working time and daycare 
service. As measured by ROE, performance is negatively related to flexible working 
time and additional maternity leave, while the number of employees is positively re-
lated to almost all work-family practices—hinting at the economies of scale in the 
provision of work-family practices. 
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Table 15: RE effect logit model for different work-family practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Vacation Flextime Daycare Maternity leave 
     
Socially- -1.289 -.160 2.780*** -1.144 
orienteda (-1.44) (-.21) (2.81) (-1.15) 
     
Classic 1.402 .744 2.089** 3.168*** 
industryb (1.52) (.97) (2.05) (3.10) 
     
Female em- .069*** .034* .049* .022 
ployees (%) (2.79) (1.69) (1.90) (.83) 
     
No. of  .008** .003 .015*** .005 
employees (1.96) (.92) (3.30) (1.14) 
     
ROE .011 -.018* .020 -.011 
 (.72) (-1.86) (1.50) (-.70) 
     
Year .968*** .942*** .407*** 1.037*** 
 (7.69) (10.80) (5.99) (7.69) 
     
_cons -1952.6*** -1894.2*** -827.9*** -2091.1*** 
 (-7.70) (-10.80) (-6.05) (-7.71) 
lnsig2u     
_cons 2.929*** 2.600*** 3.347*** 3.361*** 
 (10.16) (10.25) (12.50) (12.50) 
No Obs. 
No groups 
844 
143 
844 
143 
844 
143 
844 
143 
a reference group is liberally-oriented welfare state; b reference group is technology industry 
t-statistics are in parentheses.* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Source: own compilation. 
 
4.4.2 Work-family practices and extraordinary employee turnover 
The correlations for all variables included in my analysis are listed in Table 16. Con-
cerning correlations for the variable of extraordinary turnover, I find it to be positively 
related to the number of employees (r=.22***) and the percentage of female employ-
ees (r=.09*). That is, larger companies and companies with a high percentage of fe-
male employees have, on average, slightly more extraordinary turnover. I find that all 
work-family practices and ROE do not correlate with extraordinary turnover (between 
r=-.03 and r=.08). Concerning interrelations between different controls, there are no 
striking correlations. I can therefore exclude multicollinearity problems (all VIF Fac-
tors are below 1.15). 
4. Comparing the Provision of Work-Family Practices across Welfare States and Industries and 
Testing Their Impact on Extraordinary Turnover 
63 
 
Table 16: Correlations among variables 
Variables 1 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 4 
1 Extraordi-
nary turnover 
1.00       
2a Vacation .08 1.00      
2b Flextime .00 .33*** 1.00     
2c Daycare -.03 .24*** .19*** 1.00    
2d Maternity 
leave  
-.01 .30*** .27*** .26*** 1.00   
3 Female em-
ployees (%) 
.09* .13*** .18*** .20*** .18*** 1.00  
4 No. of em-
ployees 
.22*** .08 .11** .25*** -.05 -.09** 1.00 
5 ROE .00 -.13*** -.15*** -.21*** -.05 -.20*** -.10** 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Source: own compilation. 
 
Table 17 provides the empirical results with extraordinary employee turnover as the 
dependent variable. Model 1 provides the results of the pooled OLS estimation, model 
2 displays the results for the RE estimation, and model 3 presents the results of the FE 
estimation. Hypothesis 2 states that work-family practices reduce extraordinary em-
ployee turnover. Depending on the practices (e.g. providing daycare services), hypoth-
esis 2 can be confirmed. The effect of all work-family practices on extraordinary turn-
over prove stable across all three estimation models. Based on all models, the provision 
of day care service reduces extraordinary turnover; however, the provision of flexible 
working time, generous vacation and additional maternity leave have no effect on ex-
traordinary turnover.  
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Table 17: Regression analysis: Work-family practices and extraordinary turno-
ver 
Variables  extraordinary turnover 
 Model 1: OLS Model 2: RE Model 3: FE 
 
Vacation 1.196 .069 -.499 
 (.85) (.10) (-.84) 
    
Flextime -.380 .961 .831 
 (-.44) (1.45) (1.26) 
    
Daycare -1.226* -.912* -1.009* 
 (-1.83) (-1.67) (-1.67) 
    
Maternity 
leave 
-.037 
(-.05) 
.460 
(.75) 
.597 
(.85) 
    
Female em-
ployees (%) 
.043* 
(1.89) 
.021 
(.86) 
.089 
(1.07) 
    
No of em-
ployees 
.012** 
(2.42) 
.013*** 
(2.72) 
.008 
(1.12) 
    
ROE .011 
(.69) 
.017 
(1.49) 
.024* 
(1.85) 
    
Classic in-
dustry 
-.196  
(-.21) 
 
.135 
(.14) 
 
Liberally-ori-
ented state 
-.108 
(-.14) 
.410 
(.48) 
 
    
Year dum-
mies 
yes yes no 
_cons -1.508 -2.292* -3.978 
 (-.97) (-1.65) (-1.58) 
No of obs. 433 433 433 
No of groups 98 98 98 
R² .08 .06 .04 
F- value   1.68 
Wald chi²  22.45  
Breusch Pa-
gan Lagrange  
multiplier test 
  
 
 
Prob>chi²  ***  
Hausman test    
Prob>chi²   n.s. 
t-statistics are in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Source: own compilation. 
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Although it is not the primary interest of this paper, the sign and significance level of 
the controls on extraordinary turnover are noteworthy. In the OLS model, the percent-
age of female employees is positively related to employee turnover: companies with a 
higher percentage of female employees have higher extraordinary turnover. In addi-
tion, in the OLS and the RE model, the number of employees in a company is posi-
tively related to extraordinary turnover. Performance, measured as ROE, has no impact 
on extraordinary turnover. 
4.5 Discussion 
This study firstly focuses on differences in the provision of work-family practices 
across welfare states and industries. My findings partly support institutional theory. 
Companies operating in welfare states with well-developed public systems provide 
significantly more daycare services. However, the provision of other practices, such 
as generous vacation, flexible working time and additional maternity leave, is not in-
fluenced by the welfare state in which the company operates. According to 
DEX/SCHEIBEL (2001), some practices are less easily regulated by external resources 
like the state. Institutional pressure might be more effective on practices concerning 
the reconciliation of family and work instead of the reconciliation of work-life balance. 
In addition, companies operating in the classic industry provide significantly more 
daycare services and additional maternity leave. This result might also be driven by 
the fact that external pressure aims at practices implemented for parents with a special 
need of the use of these practices.  
The study also secondly reveals the impact of work-family practices on extraordinary 
employee turnover. My findings show that providing daycare services is effective in 
reducing extraordinary turnover in a company. Moreover, I make use of the panel 
structure in my sample, carrying out different panel estimations to address potential 
problems of unobserved heterogeneity at the company level. The results are robust in 
all panel estimation models and show a beneficial effect: companies can reduce ex-
traordinary employee turnover through the provision of day care services. However, 
other work-family practices have no effect on extraordinary turnover. 
The failure to find that generous leave politics, such as longer maternity leave and 
generous vacation, are negatively related to extraordinary employee turnover might be 
explained by the type of benefits. Practices such as daycare services combine work 
and family; however, maternity leave, vacation and sabbaticals are practices that cut 
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back on working hours. BLAIR-LOY/WHARTON (2002) consider the use of work-family 
practices and find that more than two-thirds of the sample reported having no need or 
interest in cutting back on paid hours. Therefore, certain work-family practices might 
only decrease extraordinary employee turnover when employees consider using these 
practices.  
Overall, the study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the lack of longi-
tudinal data in the previous literature did not allow for the identification of causal ef-
fects. My results support a link between the provision of daycare services and extraor-
dinary turnover; however, because I do not have complete data on my turnover varia-
ble I cannot look at time-lagged relationships. Causality is only implied but I cannot 
test it directly. Definitive answers to the causality question are only possible when one 
conducts an ideal, and consequently, improbable empirical experiment. Second, the 
study contributes to the empirical evidence in Asian countries and the United States, 
implying that work-family practices decrease employee turnover while taking into ac-
count turnover differences in countries and industries by focusing on extraordinary 
employee turnover. Thirdly, it supports and extends the results of the studies by DEN 
DULK/PETERS/POUTSMA (2012) and DEN DULK et al. (2013) by looking at listed Eu-
ropean companies and at industry differences in the provision of work-family prac-
tices.  
Whereas my research contributes to existing studies by employing longitudinal data as 
well as different industries and countries, my study has a number of potential limita-
tions. Firstly, my empirical data does not provide information on the use of work-
family practices. Employees’ views on using work-family practices might provide 
more insight into the effectiveness of different practices in terms of commitment and 
turnover. It would be interesting to see differences in the availability and the use of 
work-family practices. Further studies could include the extent of use and the rele-
vance of different work-family practices for employees, not just the availability of 
these practices. 
A further limitation concerns the measurement of the employee turnover variable. I 
have information on the organizational level, but no additional information on the em-
ployee level. For example, the turnover variable has several missing values because it 
is reported on a voluntary basis, and it is publicly available information. Therefore, I 
cannot fully exclude that my results are biased. Moreover, because I have firm-level 
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data, I have no information about who leaves the firm. It might be that an unmotivated 
employee leaves the company and is replaced by a skilled motivated employee. In this 
case, turnover would not necessarily be harmful (see LAZEAR/SPLETZER 2013). Further 
studies should look in more detail at the productivity of an employee who leaves the 
company.  
Thirdly, in my study, I am not able to analyze the impact of extraordinary voluntary 
turnover because the measurement of the turnover criterion variable does not distin-
guish between voluntary and involuntary employee turnover. According to HUSELID 
(1995), estimates of the effect of work-family practices on turnover might be under-
stated to the extent that these practices influence voluntary but not involuntary separa-
tion. However, by measuring only voluntary employee turnover, one cannot exclude 
the possibility of involuntary firings (see LEE et al., 2008: 668). For example, if em-
ployees anticipate being fired, they might want to avoid the stigma of firing and choose 
a “voluntarily” departure. Conversely, with involuntary turnover, one might also cap-
ture voluntary employee turnover: employees who want to leave the company might 
agree to any compromise in order to collect unemployment insurance (see LEE et al., 
2008:668). Qualitative research might be a fruitful next step in order to better under-
stand employees’ different motivations for leaving a company.  
Fourthly, there might be unobserved heterogeneity between the firms, for example, in 
the changes in corporate culture. One might argue that unobserved factors, such as 
corporate culture, do not vary over a time period of 10 years and can be seen as rather 
time-constant (see SEIFERT/SCHLENKER 2012: 193); however, unobserved heterogene-
ity might be further reduced by using further control variables as a proxy for corporate 
culture, such as a change in the executive board from a male CEO to a female CEO.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The increase in dual-income couples forms one of the most striking long-term trends 
in the labor market. The results of my study first suggest that the provision of work-
family practices, such as providing daycare services, varies across welfare states and 
industries. Companies operating in welfare states with well-developed public systems 
and companies operating in the classic industry with a higher percentage of female 
employees provide significantly more daycare services. Secondly, the results suggest 
that the provision of certain practices, such as daycare services, can be beneficial in 
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terms of reducing extraordinary employee turnover for companies. As a result, an in-
vestment in family-friendly measures, such as daycare services, can lead to a reduction 
in extraordinary turnover.  
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5. Childbearing and (Female) Research Productivity – A Personnel 
Economics Perspective on the Leaky Pipeline8 
 
Chapter 5 is a slightly modified version of the paper “Childbearing and (Female) 
Research Productivity – A Personnel Economics Perspective on the Leaky Pipeline” 
by Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull and Uschi Backes-Gellner. This paper has been pub-
lished in Journal of Business Economics 84(2014)4: 517-530. 
  
Abstract: Despite the fact that childbearing is time-consuming (i.e., associated with a 
negative resource effect), we descriptively find female researchers with children in 
business and economics to be more productive than female researchers without chil-
dren. Hence, female researchers with children either manage to overcompensate the 
negative resource effect associated with childbearing by working harder (positive in-
centive effect), or only the most productive female researchers decide to go for a career 
in academia and have children at the same time (positive self-selection effect). Our first 
descriptive evidence on the timing of parenthood among more than 400 researchers in 
business and economics from Austria, Germany and the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland hints at the latter being the case: only the most productive female research-
ers with children dare to self-select (or are selected) into an academic career. Our re-
sults have important policy implications when it comes to reducing the “leaky pipe-
line” in academia.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Financial support from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The labor force participation of women in Western countries has heavily increased 
over the past few decades. However, the percentage of women in higher ranked posi-
tions did not increase at the same pace. This so-called “leaky pipeline” can also be 
observed in academia (see figure 3): While in Germany in 2010, 52 percent of univer-
sity graduates and 42 percent of researchers who obtained a doctorate were female, 
only 14 percent of full professors (C4/W3) were female (see Expertenkommission For-
schung und Innovation 2013: 109).  
One reason for this leaky pipeline is that a woman’s decision to advance her career 
within or outside academia is influenced by the apparent trade-off between family re-
sponsibilities and career orientation. Several studies show that motherhood has an ad-
verse impact on labor supply (see PAULL 2008; XIE 1997; SHAUMAN/XIE 1996; 
BLAU/ROBINS 1988), mobility (see SHAUMAN/XIE 1996), wages (see e.g. MILLER 
2011; WALDVOGEL 1997) and career orientation (see BRANNEN 1989). The fact that 
career paths in academia require comparatively much flexibility might explain why 
many female researchers remain childless (see BUBER/BERGHAMMER/PRSKAWETZ 
2011; MASON/GOULDEN 2004; PERNA 2001; FINKEL/OLSWANG 1996).  
Existing studies investigating into the relationship between parenthood and research 
productivity are inconclusive: While e.g. SAX et al. (2002), COLE/ZUCKERMAN (1991) 
and HAMOVITCH/MORGENSTERN (1977) find childbearing not to be related to the num-
ber of publications, STACK (2004), KYVIK/TEIGEN (1996) and KYVIK (1990) find re-
search productivity for female researchers with young children to be significantly 
lower than for other researchers. To the contrary, BARBEZART (2006) and BEL-
LAS/TOUTKOUSHIAN (1999) find researchers with children to be more productive than 
those without children, and KYVIK/TEIGEN (1996) identify male researchers with more 
than two children to publish most.  
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Figure 3: The "leaky pipeline" in academia in Germany in 2010 
 
Source: Own Graph based on “Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation” (2013: 109) 
In our paper, we attempt to shed more light on the relation between parenthood and 
research productivity from a personnel economics perspective. In particular, we do not 
only study the relation between research productivity and if researchers have children, 
but also the relation between research productivity and when researchers have children. 
While we are not yet in a position to identify causality, our results might still be of 
interest in that we detect a somewhat counterintuitive positive relationship between 
motherhood and research productivity for female researchers while we find no relation 
between having children and research productivity for male researchers. Concerning 
the timing of parenthood, for female researchers we find that giving birth in a later 
career stage (after tenure) is related to a higher research productivity whereas we find, 
again, no relation for male researchers. We conclude, that either there are positive (in-
centive) effects of childbearing for female researchers, or, more likely, there is a pos-
itive process of self-selection where only the more productive female researchers de-
cide to become mothers9.  
                                                          
9 An alternative explanation might be that appointment committees in fact use higher hurdles for fe-
male researchers with children than for those without. While we do not rule out that occasionally such 
discriminatory hiring processes may exist, we expect them not to be widespread and hence conclude 
that if we observe positive productivity differences, these will be the results of a positive self-selection 
effect. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the litera-
ture and unfold our theoretical argumentation. Section 3 describes our data, variables 
and methods. In section 4, we present our findings. Section 5 concludes with first pol-
icy implications. 
5.2 Literature and Theory 
5.2.1 The “If”: The relation between parenthood and research 
productivity 
From a personnel economics perspective, there might be very different effects con-
cerning the “if” of parenthood and its relation to research productivity: On the one 
hand, having a child will reduce the time that can be spent on research (negative re-
source effect) leading to a lower research productivity. On the other hand, having chil-
dren might increase researchers’ incentives to work even harder in order to be able to 
economically care for the children (positive incentive effect). Further, there might also 
be self-selection at work – however, again, the direction is unclear. While it might be 
the case that the less productive researchers have children with a higher probability 
(negative self-selection effect), it might also be the case that the more productive re-
searchers are the ones that have children (positive self-selection effect). In what fol-
lows, we briefly elaborate on each of these effects and discuss whether and why these 
might be different for male and female researchers. 
Resource effect: Raising children is time-consuming and substantially reduces the time 
budget that can be used for research. Further, if researchers temporarily leave their job 
and stay at home, they might also lose part of their human and/or social capital needed 
to go on with their research career and successfully publish their work. While this latter 
effect might not be “dramatic” with women in academia typically only leaving their 
jobs for a rather short period of time around childbirth (see WARD/WOLF-WENDEL 
2004), having to care for a child will undoubtedly affect the amount of time available 
for research. As a result, raising children might be associated with a lower publication 
output. While in theory this negative resource effect could apply to mothers and fathers 
alike, empirical results on the division of labor within households show that mothers 
typically invest more time in child raising and household activities than fathers (see 
e.g. FINDEISEN 2011; SAYER 2005; BECKER 1985). Hence, we expect to observe the 
negative relation between raising children and publication output to be more pro-
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nounced for women and substantially less pronounced for men. Rather, for male re-
searchers, having children might result in their wives staying at home (at least tempo-
rarily), which would then even relieve the fathers from household jobs they would 
have contributed to otherwise. As a result, having children may in fact be even produc-
tivity enhancing for male researchers from a resource perspective – if it triggers tradi-
tional models of labor division in the household. The above cited empirical studies that 
find female researchers with young children to have a significantly lower research 
productivity (see STACK 2004; KYVIK/TEIGEN 1996; KYVIK 1990) and that find male 
researchers with children to be the most productive (see KYVIK/TEIGEN 1996) are com-
patible with this argumentation. 
Incentive effect: If a female researcher decides to become a mother and still advance 
her academic career, having children might also result in being even more determined 
to succeed in academia in order to be able to ensure a sufficient and reliable income 
stream to care for their children. Further, having to combine an academic career and 
family might actually help female researchers to put their academic career into per-
spective and undertake their research in a more efficient way (WARD/WOLF-WENDEL 
2004; ROPERS-HUILMAN 2000). Comparable arguments apply to male researchers: For 
them, becoming a father might also be associated with a positive incentive effect and 
a more efficient way to do their research – especially in those cases where their spouse 
decides to become a full time mother and does no longer contribute to the household 
income such that the fathers have a maximum incentive to be productive in order to be 
able to care for their family. Empirical studies that find researchers with children to be 
more productive than those without children (see BARBEZART 2006; BEL-
LAS/TOUTKOUSHIAN 1999) and that identify fathers to be most productive (see 
KYVIK/TEIGEN 1996) are well in line with this supposition.  
Self-selection effects: As parenthood is clearly endogenous, a positive or negative re-
lation between parenthood and research productivity might also be the result of a pro-
cess of self-selection where either the more productive researchers decide to become 
parents (positive self-selection effect) or the less productive researchers decide to be-
come parents (negative self-selection effect). A positive self-selection effect will be 
observed if women in academia knowingly decide on having both, a career and a fam-
ily, and only those who are confident to have enough capacity to cope with both go for 
the dual burden. All others decide to go for either kids and leave academia (then they 
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are no longer in the sample of researchers) or for their career (then they remain in the 
sample of researchers but don’t have children). As a result, the researchers in the sam-
ple who combine kids and career are the ones with above average productivity. A neg-
ative selection effect would result if women who – over the course of their career – 
realized that they are only mildly successful in academia decided to have kids in search 
of an alternative role that makes up for not being among the most successful research-
ers.  
5.2.2 The “When”: Is there a relation between the timing of 
parenthood and research productivity? 
Life-course theory: Concerning the “when” of parenthood and its relation to research 
productivity, the so-called life-course theory (ELDER 1975) might give an indication. 
According to ELDER (1975), an individual’s life course is comprised of “interlocking 
role cycles” such as work, marriage and parenthood. The concept of multiple, inter-
locking role sequences or cycles applies to situations characterized by a rapid succes-
sion of transitions with the birth of the first child representing one example for such a 
succession of transitions. As ELDER/ROCKWELL (1979: 3) argue, the successful man-
agement of resources and squeezes is strongly related to the scheduling of events and 
obligations. The economic pressure of early childbearing is one example for the adap-
tive problems that might arise from an asynchrony between resources and demands. 
While life course theory applies for parents in all occupations, it appears to be partic-
ularly suitable for parents who find themselves on a tenure track in academia. In Ger-
many, researchers in economics and business administration e.g., on average get tenure 
at the age of 38 (see SCHULZE/WARNING/WIERMAN 2008); i.e. for female researchers 
“the tenure clock” ticks at approximately the same pace as the “biological clock”. Em-
pirically, ELDER/ROCKWELL (1979) analyzed the relation between age at first birth and 
career position. They find variations in mother’s age at first birth to be associated with 
considerable differences in the career position of parents. Late childbearing apparently 
offers a number of socioeconomic advantages: The later childbearing occurs, the more 
the fathers and mothers were able to accumulate material resources and augment their 
income. Further recent studies support the argument that the timing of the first birth 
has an effect on income: TANIGUCHI (1999) and ELLWOOD/WILDE/BATCHELDER 
(2004) both find a wage penalty for early child bearers. Likewise, KIND/KLEIBRINK 
(2012) find a positive causal income effect of delaying the birth of the first child for 
5. Childbearing and (Female) Research Productivity – A Personnel Economics Perspective on the 
Leaky Pipeline 
75 
 
both, mothers and fathers. MILLER (2011) shows that especially the highly educated 
women experience a decrease in income from early childbearing and substantial in-
creases in earnings for delaying childbirth. To conclude, both, life course theory and 
the available empirical evidence on income effects of childbirth, suggest that – if in-
come is a general indicator of career success and productivity10 – there might be a 
positive relation between delaying the birth of the first child and research productivity, 
for women as well as for men.  
Resource effect: Similarly, also from a personnel economics perspective, a positive 
relation between delaying the birth of the first child and research productivity might 
also be the result of the resource effect. Arguably, the costs of career interruptions are 
highest for women who are not yet tenured and who yet have to publish in order to 
make their career. As a result, also from the perspective of the resource effect, becom-
ing a mother at a later point in time will be advantageous as compared to a situation of 
early childbirth. Further, as ISHII-KUNTZ/COLTRANE (1992) have shown, better edu-
cated women who substantially contribute to family income, have a higher propensity 
to equally share the housework with their partners. Even though mothers on average 
tend to invest comparatively more in child raising activities than fathers, it should nev-
ertheless be easier for a female researcher to keep determined in her academic career 
if her career orientated role formation is already established. To the contrary, if child 
birth happens to be early in the academic career, a woman’s career orientation may be 
suppressed (see TANIGUCHI 1999; ISHII-KUNTZ/COLTRANE 1992).  
Incentive effect: Concerning incentive effects, these should in general be stronger in 
earlier career stages, i.e., before tenure (see e.g., BACKES-GELLNER/SCHLINGHOFF 
2010; SCHLINGHOFF 2001) i.e., if parenthood increases incentives to publish and be 
productive because the researcher feels the need to earn a living for his/her family, this 
should rather make an effect in earlier career stages (and not when the researcher is 
already tenured). Hence, from the perspective of the incentive effect, it is early child-
birth that might positively affect research productivity, not late childbirth. The results 
by SMITH/SMITH/VERNER (2013) that provide empirical evidence for higher promotion 
                                                          
10 However, there is evidence – at least outside academia – that wages do not only reflect productivity 
differences but may also reflect differences in social norms – particularly when comparing wages of 
males and females as shown by JANSSEN/TUOR/BACKES-GELLNER (2015). But of course, a large part 
of descriptive differences in the gender wage gap is due to differences in labor attachment, in career 
choices or in working time patterns as shown in an overview for example by KOLESNIKOVA/LIU 
(2011).  
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probability into a CEO position for women who gave first birth at a young age would 
also fit into this picture.  
Self-selection effects: Also with respect to the timing of childbirth, there might be a 
process of self-selection where arguably the more productive and career-oriented re-
searchers decide to become parents at a later stage of their academic career. Accord-
ingly, a later childbirth might indicate a stronger career “taste” (BLACK-
BURN/BLOOM/NEUMARK 1993).  
5.3 Data, Variables and Methods 
Our study is based on a unique data set of 419 researchers in business and economics 
from Austria, Germany and the German-speaking part of Switzerland. The data set 
contains information on researchers’ journal publication output until 2010, research-
ers’ age, gender and field (“business administration” vs. “economics”). While the data 
on publication output and demographics are collected on a regular basis via the online 
portal Forschungsmonitoring initialized by the German Economic Association Verein 
für Socialpolitik covering more than 4,000 researchers in business administration and 
economics in the German speaking countries at different career stages, we gathered 
the information on the family situation (having children: if and when, and living in a 
partnership: yes or no) via an additionally conducted survey of the researchers in the 
data set in 2010.  
As dependent variable we use researchers’ annual publication output in refereed jour-
nals as an indicator of research productivity. To account for a potentially differing 
quality of journal publications, we use the ‘Handelsblatt’ Journal ranking as one of the 
most visible, though not uncontroversial, journal rankings for the researchers in the 
data set (see KRAPF (2011) for the details). To measure publication productivity, we 
divide a researcher’s quality- and coauthor-adjusted journal publication output as 
measured in ‘Handelsblatt’ points by his or her ‘career age’, i.e., by the number of 
years since the researcher published his or her first journal article (see MUSCHAL-
LIK/PULL 2015).11 For the researchers in our data set, the average publication produc-
tivity amounts to 0.14 publication points per year where one single-authored article in 
                                                          
11 As a robustness check we also measured career age by the number of years since obtaining the PhD 
(see e.g. FIEDLER et al. 2008; CHLOSTA et al. 2010) and find our results to be robust to this alteration. 
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“The Journal of Business Economics (Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft)” is ascribed 
0.20 publication points.  
Our central explanatory variable in our first regression is the dummy variable “chil-
dren” (1 = the researcher has at least one child, 0 = otherwise). 60 percent of the re-
searchers in our data base have children, 40 percent do not (yet) have children (51 
percent among the female researchers, and 38 percent among the male researchers). In 
our second regression, we look at the timing of the first birth and distinguish between 
researchers who became a parent before obtaining their PhD, with or after obtaining 
their PhD and with or after getting tenure. 24 percent of the researchers in our sample 
got their first child before obtaining their PhD (28 percent of the females and 23 per-
cent of the males), 63 percent became a parent with or after obtaining their PhD (64 
percent of the females and 63 percent of the males), and 13 percent got their first child 
with or after getting tenure (8 percent of the females and 14 percent of the males).  
As a first important control variable we include the researcher’s gender. 18 percent of 
researchers in our data set are female, 82 percent are male. Besides controlling for 
gender, we also estimate our regressions separately for male and female researchers in 
order to detect potential differences in how the explanatory and control variables relate 
to research productivity. Further, we include whether the researcher lives alone or in a 
partnership in an attempt to grasp a researcher’s family situation and potential support 
structure. 81 percent of the researchers in our data set live in a partnership. Further-
more, we control for age. Mean age is 42, ranging from 28 years of age until 70. As 
further controls, we include field of research (“business administration” vs. “econom-
ics”), research abroad, and mentoring participation.12 Table 18 displays the means, 
standard deviations and correlations of all variables. All variance inflation factors 
(VIF) were below 1.32; i.e., there is no multicollinearity problem. 
                                                          
12 Since BREUNINGER (2012), working on the same data set, detected “research abroad” (defined as a 
research stay of at least one month at a foreign research institution) to be related to research productiv-
ity, we also include it as a control variable. 71 percent of the researchers in our data set stayed at a for-
eign research institution for at least one month. With the same reasoning, we further control for a re-
searcher’s attendance of a formal mentoring program, since MUSCHALLIK/PULL (2015) have found 
publication productivity to differ between researchers who attended or still attend a formal mentoring 
program. Five percent of researchers in our dataset attended or still attend a formal mentoring pro-
gram. 
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Table 18: Variables: Means, standard deviations and correlations 
Variables Mean Sd (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Research 
Productivity 
.142 .131 1      
(2) Children  
(dummy, 1=yes) 
.600 .491 .025 1     
(3) Female 
(dummy, 1= 
yes) 
.184 .388 -.134*** -.108** 1    
(4) Partnership 
(dummy, 1=yes) 
.811 .392 .033 .420*** -.090* 1   
(5) Age 43 9.393 -.133*** .347*** -.244*** .181*** 1  
(6) Bus.Adm. 
(dummy, 1=yes) 
.594 .492 -.024 -.014 .041 .043 -.066 1 
(7) Research 
abroad (dummy, 
1=yes) 
.706 .456 .200*** .052 -.093* .128** .059 -.111** 
(8) Formal men-
toring (dummy, 
1=yes) 
.053 .225 .057 -.003 .219*** .004 -.109** .041 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
Source: own compilation. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 The “If”: The relation between parenthood and research 
productivity 
The relation between parenthood and research productivity is analyzed using an Ordi-
nary Least Squares (OLS) estimator with robust standard errors (Table 19). As a result 
of missing variables we have n=352 cases altogether, 61 female researchers and 291 
male researchers.  
When we run the model for all researchers in our data base (males and females), 
parenthood does not seem to be related to research productivity. The same is true, if 
we only look at the male researchers i.e., positive and negative effects associated with 
parenthood apparently outweigh one another for males. However, when the sample is 
restricted to female researchers, having children is associated with a higher research 
productivity i.e., for female researchers, the negative resource effects associated with 
having children are apparently overcompensated by a positive incentive effect or a 
positive self-selection effect where the most productive female researchers get chil-
dren - or a mix of both. Our result is robust with respect to our measure of career age: 
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when we alternatively measure career age by the number of years since obtaining the 
doctorate instead of years since first publication, we find the very same results. 
Concerning the controls, we find that female researchers apparently have a lower re-
search productivity as measured in publication points per career year. This is compat-
ible with the results obtained by e.g., FOX/FAVER (1985), BELLAS/TOUTKOUSHIAN 
(1999) or STACK (2004). Partnership is not significantly related to research productiv-
ity, neither for the males nor for the females. Age is negatively related to research 
productivity, i.e. the younger researchers have a higher research productivity measured 
in publication points per career year. The field of research (“business administration” 
vs. “economics”) does not seem to make a difference. As in previous research with the 
same data set, stays abroad and formal mentoring are positively related to research 
productivity. While we cannot exclude reverse causality at this point, previous work 
employing matching techniques finds evidence for stays abroad (see BREUNINGER 
2012) and formal mentoring (see MUSCHALLIK/PULL 2015) to positively influence re-
search productivity. 
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Table 19: The "if": The relation between parenthood and research productivity 
(OLS) 
 OLS 
Research productivity 
 All Women Men 
Children (dummy, 1=children) .023 
(.014) 
.104* 
(.056) 
.011 
(.016) 
Female (dummy, 1=yes) -.062*** 
(.018) 
  
Partnership (dummy, 1=yes) -.006 
(.021) 
-.030 
(.027) 
.002 
(.027) 
Age -.003*** 
(.001) 
-.007 
(.004) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
Bus.Adm. (dummy, 1=yes) -.004 
(.014) 
.004 
(.029) 
-.004 
(.015) 
Research abroad (dummy, 1=yes) .050*** 
(.014) 
.071** 
(.027) 
.044** 
(.017) 
Formal mentoring (dummy, 1=yes) .044* 
(.026) 
-.000 
(.036) 
.077** 
(.039) 
Constant .257*** 
(.041) 
.306** 
(.151) 
.254*** 
(.044) 
R² .096 .191 .076 
No. of observations 352 61 291 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 Source: own compilation. 
Figure 4 displays the research productivity of female researchers in the time period 
five years before giving birth to their first child and five years afterwards. As can be 
seen, research productivity actually peaks at birth. Taking into account the length of 
publication cycles, the graph hints at female researchers deciding to become pregnant 
only after they managed to successfully publish their work and be up for tenure. This 
clearly hints at a process of positive self-selection where only females who are highly 
productive in the first place decide to have a child while at the same time striving for 
an academic career. Further, the fact that research productivity goes down after birth, 
hints at the presence of a negative resource effect that only the very productive re-
searchers manage to overcompensate. 
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Figure 4: Research productivity of female researchers before giving birth and 
afterwards 
 
Source: Own data 
5.4.2 The “When”: Is there a relation between the timing of 
parenthood and research productivity? 
In a next step we look at the timing of parenthood and distinguish between (a) re-
searchers who get their first child before the doctorate, (b) researchers who get their 
first child in the year of their doctorate or later, but before they get tenure, and (c) 
researchers who get their first child in the year they get tenure or later. Researchers 
without children constitute the reference group.  
Again, we use an OLS estimator with robust standard errors (Table 20) and apply the 
same control variables as before. The dependent variable again is average annual re-
search output, i.e., research productivity, measured as a researcher’s publication output 
in refereed journals (in terms of ‘Handelsblatt’ points) divided by career age. The num-
ber of cases is slightly reduced because of missing timing information. As our results 
for the controls are the same as before, in what follows we only report on the results 
for the timing variable. 
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Table 20: The "when": The relation between parenthood in different career 
phases and research productivity (OLS) 
 OLS 
Research productivity 
 All Women Men 
Birth of first child before doctorate a .002 
(.018) 
.074 
(.048) 
-.011 
(.019) 
Birth of first child with/after doctorate a .024 
(.016) 
.103 
(.064) 
.012 
(.018) 
Birth of first child with/after tenure a .039 
(.024) 
.183** 
(.077) 
.022 
(.026) 
Female (dummy, 1=yes) -.059*** 
(.018) 
  
Partnership (dummy, 1=yes) -.005 
(.021) 
-.037 
(.027) 
.027 
(.028) 
Age -.003*** 
(.001) 
-.007 
(.004) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
Bus.Adm. (dummy, 1=yes) -.003 
(.013) 
-.006 
(.029) 
-.002 
(.016) 
Research abroad (dummy, 1=yes) .046*** 
(.015) 
.061** 
(.027) 
.040** 
(.018) 
Formal mentoring (dummy, 1=yes) .048* 
(.027) 
.000 
(.037) 
.081** 
(.041) 
Constant .245*** 
(.042) 
.310** 
(.147) 
.242*** 
(.046) 
R² .099 .222 .078 
No. of observations 343 60 283 
a: reference group: researchers without children, Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<.01, ** p<.05, 
* p<.1 Source: own compilation. 
For the full sample as well as for the subgroup of male researchers, we find the timing 
of the first birth not to be related with research productivity. For the subgroup of female 
researchers we find that female researchers that gave birth to their first child after get-
ting tenured have a higher research productivity than researchers without children. For 
female researchers that gave birth to their first child before getting tenure there is no 
significant difference in research productivity as compared to the childless female re-
searchers. As the positive incentive effects associated with parenthood should be larger 
in earlier career phases, the fact that only the later births are positively related to re-
search productivity hints at a process of positive self-selection to be at work: The more 
productive female researchers are confident to manage both: their academic career and 
motherhood.  
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Further, if the ones that decide to go for their career and have children at the same time 
are really the more productive ones, they are also likely to receive tenure earlier be-
cause they have a good enough track-record at an earlier point in time, which makes it 
more likely that their children are born after they got tenure. This, too, would explain 
why mothers who give birth to their first child after tenure are more productive than 
others: it would again be a positive self-selection effect. Lastly, our result is also com-
patible with a story of risk minimization of academic mothers, i.e., female researchers 
that decide to have children attempt to find the “least risky” moment to do so – i.e., 
the moment where a number of papers have been accepted for publication. Since such 
a risk minimization strategy supports our argument that female researchers with chil-
dren have a strong preference for being successful in order to guarantee a sufficient 
and stable income to take good economic care for their children in the long term, we 
do not try to further empirically disentangle the two explanations.  
As a robustness check for our results on the timing of childbirth, we also included 
“tenure” and “no. of children” and find our results to be robust to this alteration. Also, 
measuring career age as the number of years since obtaining the doctorate does not 
change our central results. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
In descriptive analyses for researchers in business and economics departments, we find 
female researchers with children to be more productive than female researchers with-
out children – although a negative resource effect would suggest that the productivity 
of females is reduced as a result of childbearing. We argue that the positive productiv-
ity differential can be explained by a positive incentive and/or a positive self-selection 
effect. Our empirical results hint at a strong positive (self)selection where only female 
researchers with a far above average productivity (the high-performers) dare to go for 
a career in academia and have children at the same time – and/or where only these 
exceptionally productive female researchers are able to successfully pass the many 
selection steps built into the system.  
Thus, with tenure and biological clock ticking at the same time, our results indicate 
that in comparison to male researchers a substantial number of equally talented and 
equally high achieving female researchers either “get lost” on their way (and leave 
academia for another job) – just because they wanted to have children and were afraid 
not to be able to manage the dual burden – or they remain childless (which is no better 
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from a societal perspective given the demographic problems being faced in many de-
veloped countries). To the contrary, male researchers typically do not face the same 
tradeoff: in most cases those who want to have children rely on their wives in case the 
dual burden comes too hard on them. Thus, for males, the potential of talented re-
searchers is much better exploited than for females – leading to the well-known “leaky 
pipeline”. While our results are rather descriptive and should hence be interpreted with 
caution they are in accordance with the preliminary results of a recent working paper 
by KRAPF/URSPRUNG/ZIMMERMANN (2013) who work with a different data set and 
different methods. This makes us confident that our results are more than mere statis-
tical artifacts, and it encourages us to formulate the following policy implications. 
If a country (or a single university) does not want to waste the innovative potential of 
half of its population, appropriate steps need to be taken to avoid that among female 
graduates mainly the very high and top performers dare to stay in or are selected into 
academia – while for the males the whole distribution of talents is exploited. Ideally, 
policy measures should consist of two parts: First, measures should be taken to reduce 
the burden of childcare for female researchers (i.e., reduce the negative resource ef-
fect), e.g. by ensuring a sufficient supply of daycare centers for toddlers, kindergarten-
ers or school-kids within the university context. This will also help male researchers 
who want to take their share in child caring activities and hence in the long run may 
also generate an additional support for female researchers with partners in academia 
who want to become a mother. And, of course, a sufficient supply of childcare will 
also help the female top performers – who even in today’s world decide to stay in 
academia – to further improve their research productivity. Second, measures should be 
taken that clearly signal all female researchers that they will not be disadvantaged if 
they decide to go for kids: e.g., by being able to stop the tenure clock or by installing 
an explicit handicap-system in appointment tournaments. Stopping the tenure clock 
would imply that tenure-track faculty members (e.g., tenure-track-‘Junior Professors 
or Assistant Professors’ in the German system) can delay their tenure review for family 
reasons if they think their research productivity is negatively affected.13 A handicap-
system would e.g. mean that female researchers with children need a lower number of 
                                                          
13  FLAHERTY/LESLIE/KRAMER (2013), e.g., show that the research output at the time of the tenure re-
view of faculty members who stopped their tenure clock is not significantly different from non-
users and they conclude that „stopping the tenure clock polices“ are effective for leveling out the 
playing field for the tenure decision. However, they also find that faculty members stopping the 
clock suffer from lower incomes as stopping the tenure clock might signal a lower commitment. 
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publications to get tenure or to succeed in an appointment tournament than males or 
females without children.14 Both, the ability to stop the tenure clock and the specific 
features of a handicap system could be especially tailored to keep all talented and not 
only the very top performing female researchers in academia and allow them to have 
children at the same time (as it is the case for the male researchers over the whole 
talent distribution). Only very strong signals for female researchers (see NIE-
DERLE/SEGAL/VESTERLUND 2013, for a similar point concerning quotas) are likely to 
weaken the strong self-selection effect. By leveling out the playing field for up-coming 
female researchers with and without kids hopefully more talented female researchers 
will decide to go for an academic career and for kids, which in turn will help to reduce 
the leaky pipeline effect.   
                                                          
14  Interestingly, a handicap-system favoring female researchers with children would not reduce in-
centives for the others, but would in fact restore incentives for all researchers by reducing contest-
ant heterogeneity – as has been shown theoretically for appointment tournaments (see 
CHLOSTA/PULL 2010) and empirically for tournaments in a business context (see BACKES-
GELLNER/PULL 2013). 
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6. Conclusion 
Strategies concerning the reconciliation of work and family life have gained in im-
portance when it comes to encouraging an equal participation of women in the labor 
force. The implementation of work-family practices might help employees to combine 
work and family life and reduce the burden of childcare for both genders. By ensuring 
a sufficient supply of childcare services and offering flexible working time, a country 
(or a single company) can help all of its employees reach their fullest potential (see 
e.g. KONRAD/MANGEL 2000). This doctoral thesis provided a deeper analysis on the 
topic of gender, work-family practices, and productivity. The following summarizes 
the findings of this doctoral thesis and gives implications for further research.  
Chapter 2 shed light on the performance effects of having a more gender diverse board. 
The findings indicated that only if a critical mass of about 30 percent female represen-
tation on a board is reached will gender diversity have performance-enhancing effects. 
We found evidence that gender diversity at first negatively affects firm performance 
and increases firm performance only after a threshold of about 30 percent female rep-
resentation in the boardroom is reached. When we translated the critical mass of 30 
percent women into an absolute number given our sample firms, we found that having 
about three women in the board is the “magic number.” These results contributed to 
the critical mass theory introduced by KANTER (1977), who examined the effect of 
different gender compositions and argued against tokenism in organizations.  
Chapter 3 analyzed the importance of providing a female-friendly culture to gain 
higher representation of female directors in the boardroom. So far, little was known 
about the drivers of female representation in the boardroom. This chapter extended the 
previous literature by focusing on winning a working mother award as a signal for a 
company’s female-friendly culture. According to signaling theory, it seemed plausible 
to argue that women who are able to choose on which boards they want to serve might 
look for signals of a female-friendly culture. Companies can invest in the implemen-
tation of work-family practices to receive a nomination for a working mother award. 
The findings from four different European companies showed that the companies’ hav-
ing won working mother awards had a positive effect on the percentage of female 
directors three years later.  
Chapter 4 investigated the provision of work-family practices in different welfare 
states and industries and tested their impact on extraordinary turnover. So far, 
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knowledge about the influence of different institutional settings, namely welfare states 
(socially oriented versus liberally oriented) and industrial settings (classic industry 
versus technology industry), on the provision of work-family practices as well as their 
impact on extraordinary turnover has been limited. The theoretical framework was, on 
one hand, based on institutional theory and stressed the importance of taking different 
institutional settings into account. On the other hand, the turnover approach of the ef-
ficiency wage models proposed that work-family practices reduce extraordinary em-
ployee turnover in a country and an industry. First, the results showed statistically sig-
nificant differences in the provision of work-family practices across welfare states and 
industries; for example, companies operating in socially oriented states and classic in-
dustries are more likely to offer benefits such as daycare services. Second, the findings 
supported a statistically significant relationship between some practices, such as 
providing daycare services, and extraordinary employee turnover. Possible endogene-
ity problems were addressed using a longitudinal dataset.  
Chapter 5 provided a deeper insight into the relationship between parenthood and re-
search productivity from a personnel economics perspective. In addition to the rela-
tionship between research productivity and if researchers have children, the relation-
ship between research productivity and when researchers have children was also con-
sidered. Concerning the “if” of parenthood, this chapter empirically detected a some-
what-counterintuitive positive relationship between motherhood and research produc-
tivity for female researchers. Concerning the “when” of parenthood, the findings indi-
cated that giving birth in a later career stage increased the research productivity of 
female researchers. These findings supported the idea of positive (incentive) effects of 
childbearing for female researchers, or, more likely, there was a positive process of 
self-selection in which only the more productive female researchers decided to become 
mothers.  
The findings of the individual chapters have important practical implications. Without 
mandated gender quotas and without any restrictions of the supply side of qualified 
and eligible women willing to serve on corporate boards, female representation in the 
range of 30+ percent has firm performance–enhancing effects. However, if gender 
quotas are mandated in the future (see ADAMS/KIRCHMAIER 2013), the demand for 
women will increase and potential female board members will be able to choose which 
boards they join. Signaling a female-friendly culture via winning a working mother 
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award can give companies a chance to attract potential female board members. If com-
panies face difficulties in filling their boards with qualified female board members, 
they can consider investing in work-family practices to obtain a nomination for a work-
ing mother award.  
This dissertation further deepened the issue of work-family practices. It showed the 
importance of external pressures such as a specific welfare state or a specific industry 
on the provision of work-family practices such as daycare services. These findings 
suggested that institutional pressures might be helpful for the organizational provision 
of family-friendly benefits. Furthermore, the findings implied that the provision of 
work-family practices such as daycare services might be beneficial in terms of reduc-
ing turnover for companies. The finding that women with children in academia are 
more productive in terms of journal publications than women without children gave 
further support to the provision of work-family practices. A sufficient provision of 
work-family practices might help to reduce the dual burden of work and family.  
Although this doctoral thesis revealed important implications about gender, work-fam-
ily practices, and productivity, some general limitations should be considered. The in-
dividual chapters of this dissertation used data from different countries. While chapter 
5 used data from Germany, Austria, and the German-speaking part of Switzerland, the 
data used in chapters 3 and 4 contained information about four different European 
countries (Germany, Sweden, Italy, and the United Kingdom). Chapter 2 was restricted 
to German data. Considering the different datasets used in this dissertation, missing 
data was a recurring issue that might bias the results. In chapter 5, the dataset contained 
results from a survey of 419 researchers, and some researchers declined to provide all 
information. Chapter 2 dealt with a hand-collected dataset of 151 German companies, 
and missing values are due to outliers or information that was not publicly available. 
The information in the dataset used in chapter 3 and 4 was collected from Thomson 
Reuters and contains a large number of observations with some missing information, 
such as the percentage of female employees, the percentage of female managers, and 
employee turnover. Because this information was reported on a voluntary basis by 
companies in their annual reports, information is not available for all companies. 
Hence, the results are potentially biased, and the results should be generalized with 
caution.  
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The most challenging issue in all chapters was reversed causality. I addressed this point 
in each chapter according to the data and the variables. In chapter 5, I was not able to 
identify causality due to the cross-sectional dataset. In chapter 2, the analysis was 
based on a balanced panel with a period of five years. Here the random effect estimator 
was used because, for more than a third of the firm’s population, the main explanatory 
variable, gender diversity, did not change over time. In chapters 3 and 4, my findings 
were based on longitudinal panel data covering a time span of ten years. In chapter 4, 
I also presented the results of the random effect estimator. In chapter 3, I addressed 
potential heterogeneity problems by using a fixed effects estimator and established a 
causal link by lagging my central explanatory variable by one year as well as by three 
years. However, although I could not fully rule out endogeneity problems for unob-
servable variables that change over time, by using the FE estimator, I controlled for all 
unobservable factors that are time-invariant.  
Further research might address additional gaps in the literature on gender issues in the 
workplace. Several researchers have stressed the importance of institutional and cul-
tural context when analyzing gender diversity and its effects (see SCHNEID et al. 2015). 
Hence, further research should investigate cross-country analyses in more detail. 
Moreover, my findings were based on quantitative empirical data. While these findings 
provide the first tentative implications for a corporate strategy, they also call for more 
qualitative research in this area. Qualitative research is needed to understand how a 
society can bridge the gender gap in academia and business. By recording their atti-
tudes and behaviors, qualitative interviews with female employees about their motiva-
tion to pursue a career in top corporations or to stay in academia can provide infor-
mation for deeper analyses. Combining qualitative and quantitative insights seems to 
be a fruitful step for further research.  
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